

Are the Browns Down? A Quantitative Test of the Effect of Racial Minority Status and Other Core Characteristics on Racial Identity Valuation

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Abstract

The question of why individuals value identities like their race is contested terrain. Scholars in the Reflected Appraisals tradition have famously argued that members of racial and other minority groups experience identity devaluation and related stress (Hacker, 1992; Hoff-Sommers, 2000; Harris, 1993; Meyer, 1995; McIntyre, 2002; Tatum, 1997) and “like” their identities less in empirical terms than members of majority groups (Hacker, 1995; Harris, 1993). This argument has been advanced often in both domestic and multi-national contexts (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 2003), but fairly few rigorous quantitative tests of it seem to have ever been conducted (but see Charles, 2003). This paper involves an empirical test of the hypothesis that membership in a minority racial in-group predicts lowered valuation of in-group identity. I employ ordinal and List Experiment surveys to determine whether members of several minority groups (Blacks, Hispanics, Asian Americans, Natives) value their identities less than whites in terms of (1) placing lower monetary values upon them and (2) being hypothetically more willing to change them. My hypothesis is that identity valuation will not be status dependent: minority status will not correlate to a statistically significant degree with lowered identity valuation, because development of oppositional identities allows minorities to value themselves despite potential discrimination (Simein, 2005; Stern, 1995). This thesis was partly but not totally confirmed. Racial minority status was in fact a significant positive predictor of racial identity valuation during t-tests, linear regressions, and logistic regressions but a negative predictor of valuation during List Experiment analysis. List Experiment results also indicate that whites may be less honest about their levels of in-group identification than minorities.

Keywords: whiteness as property, value of whiteness, Linked Fate, Black pride, critical race

Introduction and Literatures

The question of how the real and perceived status of the in-groups to which an individual belongs (i.e. dominant as versus minority race, sex, class) affects the extent to which they “like” and value those in-group identities (i.e. Black American) is an important one. The question is inherently interesting, and the level to which people identify with and value in-group subcultural identities affects political behavior more than almost anything else (Block, 2011; Chong & Rogers 2005; Dawson, 2001; Horowitz 1985, 2000). There are two main scholarly perspectives on this issue. Authors writing in the Reflected Appraisals tradition argue that identity valuation is status dependent. They claim members of majority groups value their core characteristics more than members of minority groups (Hacker, 1992), because majority statuses like whiteness are a form of valuable property (Harris, 1993). Authors writing within paradigms of oppositional identity, such as the Linked Fate tradition, disagree. These scholars argue that members of minority groups often display very high levels of in-group identification – such as adherence to the heuristic “that what is good for the race is good for the individual (Block, 2011, p. 29),” - and certainly do not seem to devalue their minority identities (Simein, 2005; Stern, 1995).

Specific claims which reflect either the Theory of Reflected Appraisals (TRA) or the rival Linked Fate Theory (LFT) and other oppositional identity-based theories have obviously been advanced across the social science disciplines, in domestic (Harris, 1993) and international (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 2003) contexts. The battle rages still. The goal of this paper is to test the two opposing theories in the context of racial identity valuation, using modern methodological techniques, and determine which more closely approaches the truth.

The TRA position is the simpler argument. TRA theorists argue that dominant groups within a society often hold the traits of non-dominant groups in low regard, causing members of these subordinate identity populations to develop devalued identities (Chen, 1999; Hacker, 1995; Harris, 1993; Hoff-Sommers, 2000; Jacques & Chason, 1977; McIntyre, 2002; Tatum, 1997). The ideas of white privilege (Lucal, 1996) and whiteness as property (Hacker, 1992; Harris, 1993) provide archetypal examples of this argument. Citing the results of a well-known thought experiment he conducted among white college undergraduates, Hacker contends that American whites can actually quantify the value of their privilege, and would demand roughly \$50 million in exchange for agreeing to become Black were this hypothetically possible (1992, p. 36). Less theoretically, Tatum argues that identity devaluation occurs among Blacks and other members of racial minority groups because dominant-group perspectives tend to be validated by society, while members of subordinate or minority in-groups are labeled “defective or sub-standard (1997, p. 23).” These TRA arguments extend beyond race: Meyer claims that lesbians and gays can internalize homophobia and experience “minority stress (1995, p. 40), while Hoff-Sommers notes that feminists describe young women as “silenced” by rape and other male hate crimes (2000; p.70). TRA advocates point out that many members of minority groups have engaged in “passing” behavior, and describe this as the logical result of oppression (Harris, 1993, p. 1710).

The chief opposition to TRA comes from theories of oppositional identity, the most prominent of which in the modern American context is Linked Fate Theory (see Block, 2011; Simein, 2005; Walker, 2007). The primary thesis of LFT is that minority group members often respond to majority hostility not by developing self-hatred (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) but rather by coming to view group unity as necessary for survival (Simein, 2005, p. 530), and engaging in social and political competition as a cohesive group (Austin, Middleton, & Yon, 2012; Block, 2011; Sanchez, 2006). During inter-group conflict, fragmentation puts groups, particularly small ones, at a serious disadvantage (Horowitz, 2000). Thus, oppression and other forms of intense group competition frequently lead to increased levels of group unity (Simein, 2005), positive group consciousness (Austin, Middleton, & Yon, 2012, p. 529), and even nationalism (Block, 2011) among minority groups and presumably among other populations.

Worldwide, this effect has been observed among groups as diverse as the Fong of Gabon and the Yoruba of Nigeria (Horowitz, 2000, p. 71). Closer to home, multiple scholars have argued that it is also very observable among American Blacks and Latinos. More than 77% of Black Americans believe that what happens to other members of their race is important to them personally (Simein, 2005, p. 539), a figure higher than those recorded for whites. This sense of togetherness in the face of adversity is a cause of bloc political participation among Blacks (2005, p. 530), and a probable source of high Black self-esteem (Phelps, Taylor, & Gerard, 2001). Similarly, perceived discrimination against Hispanics has been found to increase the likelihood that Mexican Americans will identify as Latino rather than white (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006, p. 202). Moving beyond race, the collective esteem of religious minority groups engaged in inter-group competition has been linked to the achievements of entities like Israel and the Vatican (Hartman & Hartman, 2000; Winter, 1996), which provide examples of in-group successes reaching even beyond U.S. national borders. Simein, among others (Dawson, 1994), argues that discrimination makes racial collective action and the construction of collective ethnic esteem logical forms of resistance for African-Americans, and multiple scholars contend that such unified resistance is common among minority groups (Block, 2011; Horowitz, 2000; Junn, 2008; Sanchez, 2006; Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 2003).

Given this very visible conflict, conducted in large part between theoretical scholars, more empirical research is needed into the question of whether or not minority status predicts decreased valuation of in-group identities. The body of work currently in existence is inconclusive. Many argue passionately for status dependent theories of valuation (Hacker, 1995; Harris, 1993), but international observation (Horowitz, 2000) and the majority of that small group of empirical studies conducted thus far (i.e. Charles, 2003) do not necessarily provide support for their claims. LFT may provide an explanation for why not.

While not generally focused on the specific question of identity valuation, LFT scholars argue that intense group competition leads not to self-hatred but to unity (Dawson, 1994; Simein, 2005), positive shared consciousness (Austin, Middleton, & Yon, 2012), and nationalism (Block, 2011).

This paper contributes to the discipline of political science by adding to the literature a Large-N quantitative study of the actual degree to which minority race and other variables predict the valuation of respondents' racial identities. During this project, I use survey research to tackle the question of whether membership in a visible American racial minority group (Black, Hispanic, Asian-American, Native American) correlates significantly with decreased valuation of in-group identity relative to membership in the white majority group. I employ both a primary survey (Survey A) containing standard ordinal questions and a completely anonymized List Experiment survey divided into two instruments (Surveys B and C) to test these questions. The data obtained using my primary survey instrument was analyzed using cross-tabulation, linear regression, and logistic regression in STATA 9.0, while List Experiment data was analyzed via cross-tabulation and t-testing techniques within the same program. Obviously, my finding a statistically significant negative correlation between minority race and racial identity valuation would support the Theory of Reflected Appraisals, while finding no such correlation or a positive correlation between minority race and valuation would support a Linked Fate or Oppositional Identification paradigm.

Some Highly Educated Guesses: Primary Hypotheses and Underlying Theory

In a sentence, my theory is that identity valuation does not depend upon in-group status. While the question remains unsettled – and thus worth researching - those empirical reviews conducted so far provide more support for a Linked Fate theory of identity valuation than for the TRA hypothesis that valuation is status-determined. Hacker's (1992) single thought experiment is interesting and innovative work. However, across many nations, members of minority groups post scores similar to those of majority groups on tests of individual and collective esteem (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 2003). In the USA, Black women do not seem to value themselves less than white women (Lovejoy, 2001; Sekayi, 2003, p. 472), and – although this is not this paper's focus - women as a group do not value their sex less than men (Mackie, 1983). Broadly speaking, empirical studies globally indicate that levels of in-group identification and collective esteem are often similar across organized identity populations (Charles, 2003; Horowitz, 2000;; Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 2003). These findings imply the same may be true for racial identity valuation, and call into doubt the accuracy of the TRA paradigm.

The assumption that the central theses of TRA are incorrect leads to my primary hypothesis. I hypothesize that racial minority status will not correlate to a statistically significant degree with the level of compensation demanded by respondents to change their race or the yes: no likelihood of respondent racial change, and I expect this second thesis to hold true during my analysis of List Experiment data as well as Survey A data. Numerous authors have pointed out that levels of individual esteem are at least as high among American Blacks as among whites (Phelps, Taylor, & Gerard, 2001; Phinney, 1990). While this is not always true of other minority groups (Chen, 1999, p. 599), members of groups like the Chinese/Asian American community score high on self-efficacy scales and often express considerable pride in their background (p. 599). More broadly, authors studying in-group identification and group esteem among American racial minorities (Dawson, 1994; Simein, 2005) and minority ethnic populations globally (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 2003) conclude that this is also high. Given these findings, I do not expect race to have a significant effect on the valuation of racial identity.

H1: Minority racial group membership will not have a negative effect on the valuation of racial identity.

Obviously, the models in this AABSS paper will not simply measure the effect of one core characteristic on the dependent variable of identity valuation. In addition to a set of variables representing important core characteristics (sex, orientation, and religion) inserted in each model as controls, I test the influence of a number of other traits on valuation. Because one major goal of this project is testing the predictive validity of Linked Fate Theory (LFT) as versus the more prevalent Theory of Reflected Appraisals (TRA), a Linked Fate metric is the first non-core characteristic factor variable to be added to my models. As discussed earlier, Linked Fate is the idea that one's life chances are tied to the success or failure of one's group as a whole (Simein, 2005). Given the strong linkage made in the literature between Linked Fate and traits indicative of identity valuation (2005, p. 530), I expect increasing levels of Linked Fate to correlate positively with the amount of compensation demanded by respondents to change each core characteristic and to correlate negatively with the percentage chance of respondents agreeing to change each core characteristic.

H2: Increasing levels of Linked Fate will have a positive effect on the valuation of racial identity.

I next hypothesize that increasing levels of individual self-esteem will have a statistically significant positive effect on the valuation of racial identity. Levels of individual self-esteem vary among populations (Phelps, Taylor, & Gerard, 2001), and personal esteem can influence collective esteem and thus attitudes toward an individual's in-group (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 2003, p. 520). While some scholars argue that the relationship between personal and collective self-esteem is weak, few deny that this relationship exists and some see it as strong (Hughes & Demo, 1989; Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 2003). It is thus necessary to include esteem metrics in my statistical analyses. I expect increasing levels of individual self-esteem to correlate positively with the amount of compensation demanded by respondents to change each core characteristic and to correlate negatively with the percentage chance of respondents agreeing to change each core characteristic.

H3: Increasing levels of self-esteem will have a positive effect on the valuation of racial identity.

I next hypothesize that increasing levels of in-group identification will have a statistically significant positive effect on the valuation of racial identity. Again, levels of in-group identification vary among groups, making it necessary to include this variable in models (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006). More specifically, higher levels of identification have appeared in past work to correlate with higher identity valuation. Hughes and Demo conclude that intense forms of in-group identification like Black nationalism are predictors of "pride" regarding the worth of Black racial identity (1989, p. 144), while Phelps, Taylor, and Gerard find "other group orientation," or identification with an in-group other than one's own, to be negatively correlated with at least personal and individual valuation (2001, p. 213). I expect increasing levels of in-group identification to correlate positively with the amount of compensation demanded by respondents to change each core characteristic and to correlate negatively with the percentage chance of respondents agreeing to change each core characteristic.

H4: Increasing levels of in-group identification will have a positive effect on the valuation of racial identity.

Moving past variables relevant primarily to scholars of identity, this project includes a series of hypotheses relating to key demographic variables. These include political ideology, political party affiliation, age, income, and level of education. I hypothesize first that both increasingly conservative personal ideology and affiliation with a conservative political party will have a statistically significant positive effect on identity valuation. By definition, conservatives tend to be more resistant to change than liberals, preferring to "preserve present or past" states of being rather than moving toward new ones (Shannon, 1962). Contemporary psychological research confirms this classic common-sense description. Conservatives are far less likely than liberals to share changing social attitudes on topics ranging from the acceptance of bisexuality (Herek, 2002) to the reduced role of the church in society (Kuo, 2006; Schweikart 2011, pp. 11-31); this is true to such an extent that political conservatism has been described as "sharing elements" with symbolic racism (Henry and Sears 2002: 266). Thus I hypothesize:

H5: Increasingly conservative political ideology will have a positive effect on the valuation of racial identity.

H6: Affiliation with an increasingly conservative political party will have a positive effect on the valuation of racial identity.

I next hypothesize that increasing age will have a statistically significant positive effect on the valuation of racial identity, and that increasing job status and education will have significant negative effects on the valuation of racial identity, among members of all races. In most studies of ethnocentrism and homophobia, increasing age correlates with increasing intolerance. Herek, for example, finds age to be one of the major predictors of negative attitudes toward sexual minorities (2002, p. 269). On the other hand, I do not expect wealthy and well-educated individuals to "like themselves" less than poorer or less-educated individuals, but I do expect them to be on average more experienced, tolerant, and willing to consider experimentation with different ethnic or sexual identities. Thus, I expect increasing levels of education and job status to correlate negatively with the amount of compensation demanded by respondents to change race and to correlate positively with the percentage chance of respondents agreeing to change each core characteristic, and I expect the opposite effect for age.

H12: Increasing levels of education will have a negative effect on the valuation of racial identity.

H13: Increasing levels of job status will have a negative effect on the valuation of racial identity.

H14: Increasing age will have a positive effect on the valuation of racial identity.

In sum, I hypothesize first that (1) minority as versus majority racial group membership will have no significant negative effect on the valuation of racial identity. This hypothesis is the central hypothesis of this project. I also hypothesize that (2) increasing self-esteem, (3) increasing levels of in-group identification, (4) increasing levels of Linked Fate and (5) increasing age will have a positive effect on the valuation of race. I expect the same to hold true for the impact of increasing (5) personal and (6) partisan conservatism on racial identity valuation. On the other hand, I hypothesize that (7) increasing income and (8) increasing level of education will have a negative effect on the valuation of racial identity. These results are expected to obtain for members of all racial groups.

Getting Crunchy: Data Collection and Analysis Techniques

I obtained the data needed to test the hypotheses given above via survey research, specifically the administration of two distinct surveys to more than 1,000 (N=1,404) individuals enrolled in college in the state of Illinois. The instruments employed were a standard ordinal survey (Survey A) designed to measure respondents' levels of identity valuation and other characteristics and an anonymized List Experiment consisting of two surveys (Surveys B and C). The large majority of respondents were students enrolled in undergraduate courses at Southern Illinois University (SIU-C), a large Research One university with a very diverse student body (Southern Illinois University Facts 2008). A sizable but smaller number of respondents were graduate students and faculty members at SIU-C, attendees at mandatory fraternity meetings, or students enrolled in classes at Aurora University. All survey administrations were conducted by me personally, in controlled settings such as classrooms or mandatory meetings, and without prior discussion of the nature of the survey project with respondents.

The pool for my applications of Surveys A, B, and C consisted of 19 Southern Illinois University (Carbondale) classrooms, one Aurora University classroom, and five organized non-classroom settings on the Southern Illinois University campus. These venues were selected using snowball but purposive sampling techniques, in that virtually all of them were offered to me as prospective survey locations by graduate student or junior faculty colleagues (and one fraternity President, an acquaintance from the racquetball courts), and accepted if they met my criteria for large and diverse rooms of students over 18 years of age. The overall response rate for this round of administrations was 95.6%. While snowball or purposive samples are not ideal for reasons of reliability and validity (Berg, 2006), they are a near-normal throughout the American literatures on race and ethnicity (Charles, 2003; Chen, 1999; Jordan & Deluty, 1999; Meyer, 1995; Rockquemore, 2002; Wikins, 2004). I will note also that I did conduct a smaller-N randomized re-test of my primary survey during the spring of 2013. The response rate for this "2.0" round of surveying, conducted across another 16 SIU-C classrooms, was 94%. Results obtained during this second round of surveying were substantially similar to those obtained during the first round of surveying and are available upon request.

My primary survey instrument (Survey A) is attached to the body of this paper as Appendix A. It is broadly typical of survey designs in Political Science, employing ordinal scaling of response alternatives (Manheim et al, 2006; Schuman & Presser 2004). The focal item in this survey is a question asking respondents how much compensation they would demand/require in exchange for agreeing to change their race. This question reads: "If this were possible, how much money – if any – would you require to permanently change your race? If you change, you will still have your personality and memories. However, you will be White if you are a member of any non-white minority group, and Black if you are White." Respondents are also allowed to state that they would be unwilling to change this trait for any amount of money, thus making yes: no binary logistic regression analysis of respondent change willingness possible along with ordinal linear regression analyses.

In addition to the question(s) dealing with compensation, I include a number of other items in Survey A. The instrument includes the most common measure of Linked Fate (Simein, 2005, p. 538); respondents were asked to what extent they believe that: "what happens generally to your (race) in this country will have an effect on your life." Responses were scored on a 1-4 scale. In addition, I employ the Single Item Self-Esteem Scale (SISE) as a measure of self-esteem. The SISE consists of the item: "I have high self esteem" response-rated on a five point scale ranging from one to five (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001). I chose to use the SISE because, while it is a simple instrument, the SISE correlates extremely highly with results for such older metrics as the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (2001, p. 151). Survey A also contains a measure of the extent to which respondents identify with their racial in-group, taken from the Affirmation, Pride, and Belonging Scale of the widely used Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM) (Phinney, 1992, p. 172).

Survey A also incorporates a series of demographic questions, which produced the information needed to generate the other independent variables in my models. As stated earlier, respondents were asked to provide their race, sex, sexual orientation, and religious identity; all respondents were also asked to identify their political ideology, on the standard left-right continuum employed by scholars for several decades (Wright, Erikson, & McIver, 1985). I also obtained an alternate measure of political positioning by asking respondents to identify themselves as in partisan terms as Democrats, Independents, or Republicans. Large groups of Americans, such as white Southerners and Black Democrats (Moser, 2009), do not make coherent connections “between their own partisanship and ideological preferences” or “connect the two over time” (Box-Steffensmier & De Boef, 1996), and partisanship and ideology variables can thus both independently influence socio-political attitudes. Finally, respondents were asked to provide their age, income, and level of education. These variables influence a range of phenomena and attitudes (Herek, 2003) studied by social scientists, and are included in many survey instruments (Schuman & Presser, 2004). Demographic questions were placed at the end of the survey instrument, to prevent early-occurring respondent self-categorization (2004); the last question concerned respondents’ incomes. The full suite of questions I employed allowed me to measure the way in which 11 distinct characteristics affect identity valuation.

I analyzed the data collected using Survey A via linear and logistic regression analysis. The (DV) in my both my linear and “logit” models was respondents’ willingness to change their race, defined in terms of the level of compensation demanded for racial changes in the linear model and in terms of the yes: no likelihood of a change in the logistic model. Independent variables included race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, self-esteem score, MEIM score, Linked Fate score, political ideology, political party affiliation, age, level of education, and income. Running these models allowed me to determine (1) the effect of respondents’ race on their willingness to change that race and (2) the effect of other important individual and demographic variables on respondents’ willingness to change race. In addition, running logistic models as well as linear models allowed me to measure the differing effects of my independent variables on a binary as versus a scalar dependent variable and calculate predicted probabilities for the effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable.

As the basis for a solid project, Survey A could stand alone. However, it should and did not have to. I also conducted a List Experiment using two additional instruments (Surveys B and C), in order to test my central questions using an alternative research methodology. My List Experiment design was modeled on the design developed by Sniderman and Carmines (1997; 1999). While researching levels of bigotry among whites, Sniderman and Carmines noticed that some respondents lie about racial opinions, and developed a two-stage methodology known as List Experiment surveying in order to solve this problem (1999, p. 41). In their List work, these authors first presented a control group with a survey containing four-item questions about social problems, and asked them to state how many items made them angry (p. 48). A second group of respondents was asked five-item questions, identical to those in the first survey except for the addition of one item dealing with racial bias (pp. 48-9). Unaware that they could be identified as having expressed racial prejudices, respondents answered the questions on the second survey honestly (p. 49). Sniderman and Carmines then measured the difference in the mean number of “makes me angry” responses between the first survey and the second, and used this number to determine the exact percentage of whites who described themselves as being angered by affirmative action and diversity-forward policies (p. 48).

My List Experiment survey administrations followed a nearly identical format. My control survey (Survey B) asked respondents 10 four-item questions testing their willingness to do things or change characteristics for “any amount of money.” In contrast, the focal List survey (Survey C) asked ten *five*-item questions, with items dealing specifically with willingness to change race added to the control instrument. Measuring the difference in the mean number of responses to the race-absent and race-added items allowed me to determine the percentage of respondents willing to change race when unaware that their willingness to do so could be measured. Like Survey A, Surveys B and C contained demographic questions asking respondents to identify their race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, level of self-esteem, level of in-group identification, level of Linked Fate, political ideology, partisan political affiliations, age, income, and level of education. To ensure a reasonable level of population congruence, Surveys A, B, and C were administered together during the large majority (75%) of my survey administrations.

The End of the Rainbow: Results and Discussion

{{All Tables and Figures in Appendix B}}

Data gathered using Survey A provided partial, instrument-specific support for my hypothesis that minority status does not correlate with racial identity devaluation. Within the Survey A respondent pool (N=499), not only did minority race not correlate with lowered valuation of minority racial identities, the reverse was true to a statistically significant degree. Simple cross-tabulation analyses provide a good first-stage method of analyzing white and minority levels of identity valuation. Overall, 61.2% of whites were not willing to change their race while 38.8% of whites (119 Caucasian respondents) were willing to do so. In contrast, 79% of Blacks (69 of 83), twenty-one of 29 Hispanics (72.41%), nine of 14 Asians and Polynesians (64.28%), and all Native American respondents (100%) announced that they would never change their race. While the mean number of units of compensation demanded by whites to make racial changes – on a seven unit scale – was 5.71, the mean figure for Blacks was 6.26 and the figure for all minorities together was 6.15. Both differences between the white and minority scores were statistically significant at standard (.05) levels.

Regression results further support the conclusion that minority race does not correlate with lowered valuation of racial identity. In my primary linear and logistic regression models, which included all respondents, a minority race variable had a substantial positive effect on both the amount of compensation demanded for racial change and the likelihood of respondents refusing to change at all. In the linear model, membership in a racial minority group increased the mean compensation demanded for changing race by roughly one-half of one of the dependent variable's seven levels. Minority race had similar effects in the all-respondents Survey A logistic model; the effect of the majority/minority race variable on that model's binary dependent variable was again both statistically (.003; $t = -2.93$) and substantively significant. Predicted probabilities show that the median white respondent was roughly 44% likely to change his race and the median minority respondent was only 26% likely to do so, a difference of 18%.

In one sense, finding that racial minority status may not correlate with racial identity devaluation in the American context is not surprising. Past empirical studies conducted globally have concluded that members of minority populations often have high levels of personal and collective esteem, even relative to majority group members in the same region (Charles, 2003; Guenther & Mulligan, 2013; Horowitz, 2000; Mackie, 1983; Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 2003). However, much of the American social science literature concerning issues of race has focused on the subjugation of Blacks and Latinos (Harris, 1993; Hunter, 2002; McIntyre, 2002; Tatum, 1997), and the presumed hyper-valuation of white racial identity (Hacker, 1995). Given this body of scholarship, the discovery of a positive correlation between minority race and identity valuation – with roughly 40% of Caucasians but only 20-25% of Blacks and Hispanics willing to change race – certainly is notable. This result is a direct challenge to the famous conclusion that the average white would demand \$50 million to change her race if this were possible. Under very similar classroom conditions, during another Large-N experimental design including diverse populations, typical minority respondents demanded much more.

However, List Experiment results complicate the finding that the relationship between racial minority status and racial identity valuation is positive. Beginning List research, I again expected to find no significant majority: minority differences in level of willingness to change identity. List results pertaining to racial identity valuation did not confirm this hypothesis, and were somewhat surprising in light of the conclusions of Survey A. A very large numerical majority of both majority (86%) and minority (71%) respondents did remain unwilling to change their race under List conditions. However, minority status correlated negatively and to a statistically significant degree with racial identity valuation.

In response to Surveys B and C, members of all minority groups were on average more willing to change their race than Caucasians. Among African Americans, the mean number of Survey C responses to Question 3, the question to which I added an item dealing with race, was 1.49. This was an increase of .26 from a mean of 1.23 responses to the equivalent question on Survey B. This indicates that roughly 26% of Blacks were willing to change their race under List Experiment conditions. Among the Hispanic sample, the mean number of responses to the Survey C question was 2.00, up from a Survey B mean of 1.56. This difference of .44 indicates that 44% of Latino respondents were willing to change their race in the List scenario. Results for the Asian sample were similar, and even more pronounced. The mean number of Survey C answers for Asians was 1.55, up from a mean of 1.00. 55% of Asians agreed to change their race in response to my List Experiment question. Overall, 29% of minority respondents agreed to change their race in response to Survey C.

The difference between Caucasian and minority levels of mean willingness to change racial identity was significant at the .05 level, and all differences in identity valuation between the Caucasian sub-sample and individual minority sub-samples were also significant. These results and their implications are analyzed in detail in the Discussion section of this paper.

As in the case of race and valuation, my hypothesis concerning the impact of Linked Fate on racial identity valuation was confirmed in part but not wholly. During Survey A, the Linked Fate variable did not reach standard levels of significance in the linear and logistic regressions run among all respondents, but was a significant positive predictor of racial identity valuation in separate linear and logistic regressions run among minorities alone. Among African Americans and other minorities, the effect of Linked Fate on valuation was sizable in substantive as well as statistical terms. The 4-unit Linked Fate variable had the largest unstandardized (B) coefficient among all variables (.529) and one of the smallest standard error terms (.161) in the minorities-only linear model. Any one-unit change along the continuum used to measure Linked Fate thus increased the amount of compensation minority respondents demanded for racial changes by more than ½ level. Linked Fate had a similar strong positive effect on racial identity valuation among minorities during logistic regression. A median minority respondent at the lowest level of Linked Fate would be 22.99% likely to change her racial identity, while a median minority respondent at the highest level of Linked Fate would be only 6.58% likely to do so. In contrast, Linked Fate had no statistically relevant effect on identity valuation among whites – being “significant” at the .531 level with a t-value of - .63 during linear analysis.

Finding a significant positive relationship between Linked Fate and identity valuation among minority respondents to Survey A did not fully confirm my hypothesis that Linked Fate would positively influence valuation among all respondent populations. However, this finding does support for my central hypothesis that minority status will not predict identity devaluation *because* of the operation of Linked Fate specifically among minority group members. The central claim of Linked Fate Theory is that members of minority in-groups often respond to oppression or ethnic competition with unity rather than identity devaluation (Block, 2010; Dawson, 2001; Simein, 2005; Walker, 2007). While Linked Fate can exist among all groups, the concept is generally associated with minority populations (Dawson, 1994; Junn, 2008; Sanchez, 2006). Finding that Linked Fate in fact did predict identity valuation among a Large-N population of minority group members is a conclusion consistent with Linked Fate Theory.

Like minority race but unlike Linked Fate, group identification had a consistent and positive impact on racial identity valuation across all Survey A models. The GroupID metric was a significant positive predictor of identity valuation among all respondents in both linear and logistic regression models. These identification effects were sizable; a median individual at the lowest level of racial identification had a 60.08% chance of agreeing to change his race, while a median respondent at the highest level of racial identification had only a 25.77% chance of agreeing to do so. In addition to reaching significance among all respondents, the in-group identification variable also reached statistical significance as a positive predictor of racial identity valuation among white respondents analyzed alone. Among whites, a median respondent at the lowest level of racial in-group identification had a 59.03% chance of agreeing to change his race, while a median respondent at the highest level of identification had only a 22.33% chance of agreeing to do so. Despite the fact that there were only about half as many minority respondents as white respondents in my Survey A sample, the GroupID variable also came very close to standard levels of significance in the logistic regression among minorities alone (.067; $t = -1.83$). The more attached individuals feel to in-group identities like race, the less likely they are to want to change those identities.

Conservatism, conceptualized both as personal ideology and as partisan political affiliation, also had a consistent positive impact on identity valuation. During Survey A, increasingly conservative ideology reached significance at the (.05(4)) level as a positive predictor of racial identity valuation in the logistic model including all respondents. The median liberal was 52.60% likely to change his race while the median conservative was 35.84% likely to do so. Similarly, in the all-respondents linear model, the variable representing increasingly conservative partisan affiliation reached significance as a positive predictor of identity valuation. Neither of these relationships reached formal statistical significance in the smaller-N regression models run among sub-samples of white and minority respondents. However, all 12 coefficients representing the effect of conservative partisan affiliation and conservative personal ideology on valuation were in the expected positive direction, across my six primary models. It can certainly be said that the relationship between conservatism and the valuation of racial identity appears to be a real and a positive one.

In contrast to the fairly sweeping effects of minority status, group identification, and various measures of conservatism, two other variables had more localized effects on racial identity valuation. First, female sex was a positive predictor of valuation during Survey A, in logistic regressions both among all respondents and among minority respondents taken alone. Among all respondents, the median man was 43.94% likely to change his race and the median female respondent 32.68% likely to change hers, while among minority respondents the median man was 25.3% likely to change his race but the median woman only 9.9% likely to change hers. This result was unexpected. Scholars like Simein (2005) have argued that the experience of dual race and gender oppressions may cause minority women to more strongly identify with both racial and sexual identities, but few empirical pieces dealing with the valuation of minority identities seem to conclude that this is true or even test the thesis (Hacker, 1995; McIntyre, 2002; Rockquemore, 2002; Tatum 1997). Further, I can find no explanation in the literature for a weaker but real version of the same effect among white women. I will include female sex as a factor variable in future models measuring influences on racial identity valuation, but do not expect to find it predictive.

A second factor to achieve localized significance as a predictor of racial identity valuation was increasing age, which was a positive predictor of valuation specifically among white respondents. I hypothesized that younger cohort members would attach less measurable value to race than their older counterparts, and age would be a positive predictor of identity valuation. This was in fact the case during Survey A, but only for Caucasians. The variable representing increasing age had a significant positive effect on valuation in the primary logistic regression among white respondents, and fell exactly .02 short of significance in the whites-only linear regression. The effect of age on valuation among whites was large as well as statistically significant. In predicted probabilities models, the median white respondent under 20 was 50.84% likely to change his race, while whites between 20 and 30 were 38.86% likely to make racial changes. In contrast, whites between the ages of 40 and 50 were 20.44% likely to change, and whites between the ages of 50 and 60 were only 14.89% likely to do so. This last result, along with change-willingness results for the miniscule group of white respondents over 60, represents the highest level of valuation of race to be displayed by any group of whites.

While most variables included in my statistical models were significant among all respondents during at least one survey administration, four characteristics had no effect on the valuation of racial identity among any group of respondents. These factors were: sexual orientation, religion, education level, and self-esteem. Most of these results were not particularly surprising. Religion and sexuality were introduced into the models as control variables, and were not predicted to have significant effects. There is little reason to expect gays or Protestants to be less attached to being Hispanic than straights or Catholics, and they are not. Education was hypothesized to have significant negative effects on identity valuation, as this characteristic is seen as a measure of sophistication and has been found to correlate with decreased bigotry across the literature (Fussell, 1983; Herek, 2003; Sears, van Laar, Carrillo, & Kosterman, 1997); it was unexpected that this did not occur. However, coefficients for the education variable were in the expected negative direction in almost every model, and these trends were pronounced enough not to be taken as statistical aberrations (in a typical example, education was significant at .204; $t = -1.274$ in linear regressions among whites). This variable simply failed to reach standard significance levels as a multi-unit metric running in multivariate models. Results for the self-esteem variable are perhaps most notable, given that minority activists often attribute Black and Hispanic struggles with schoolwork, socialization, and identity formation specifically low self-esteem (D'Souza, 1995; Gross, 1999; Hacker, 1995; Hoff-Sommers, 2000; Tatum, 1997). However, centrist and conservative scholars have argued for decades that there is little empirical evidence for this thesis (McWhorter, 2000; Sowell 1995; Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003). At least in the single arena of racial identification and valuation, they appear to be correct.

Unpacking the Raw Data: Discussion and Analyses

Several results merit further discussion. First, List Experiment results pertaining to the valuation of racial identity are interesting. Caucasian status had a statistically significant negative impact on racial identity valuation during Survey A and a statistically significant positive impact on identity valuation during an anonymized List Experiment employing very similar wording. During the first survey, Caucasians were more likely than any other racial group to consent to racial changes. In response to the List Experiment, however, Caucasians were the least likely group to do so. This result potentially indicates the continued operation of social desirability bias among American whites. Dozens of studies have concluded that Caucasian respondents often give dishonest or vague answers to questions dealing with race, out of fear of admitting socially unacceptable attitudes to others or to themselves (Krysan & Couper, 2003; Kuklinski & Cobb, 1997; McIntyre, 2002; Sniderman & Carmines, 1999; Speakman & Moskowitz, 2009).

List Experiments in fact serve as a best practice for uncovering the true extent of attitudes toward such touchy topics (Kuklinski & Cobb, 1997; Redlawsk, Tolbert, & Franco, 2008; Sniderman & Carmines, 1999; Streb, Burrell, Frederick, & Genovese, 2008). Assuming that openly expressing “white pride” or any strong preference for Caucasian status is currently a socially unpopular position to take (D’Souza, 1991; McIntyre, 2002; Safran, 2014; Tatum, 1997; Taylor, 1993; Tatum, 1997), it may well be that most whites recognize that their racial status has value (Hacker, 1995; Harris, 1993) or simply enjoy being white in the same way African Americans take pride in being Black – but feel most comfortable saying so when incognito.

If high but repressed levels of racial identity valuation among whites do exist, dealing with them constructively will be a critical task for the United States during this century. Many conservative authors have argued that educated American whites are asked to praise essentially every culture but their own, and respond to this simply by pretending to agree with multi-cultural tenets in public (D’Souza, 1991; D’Souza, 1995; Eastland, 1997; Kors & Silvergate, 1998; Sowell, 2005; Steele, 1990; Taylor, 1993; Williams, 2006). Covert studies by senior scholars provide significant support for this claim, concluding that (for example) real levels of distaste for affirmative action approach 100% among segments of the white population (Kuklinski & Sniderman, 1997, p. 408), and that white liberal claims of support for these programs are essentially lies (Sniderman & Carmines, 1999, p. 79). Some hidden anger or unstated racial identification among whites certainly may be attributable to bigotry (Speakman & Moskowitz, 2009; Tarman & Sears, 2005; Wood, 1994). However, contemporary levels of prejudice approach all-time lows (Plant & Devine, 2009; Schafer & Shaw, 2009; Schuman et al 1997). Almost certainly, many whites simply feel that they cannot express discomfort about failed social policies (Eastland, 1997; Murray, 1984; Williams, 2006), or attachment to their own identity (McIntyre, 2002), without being attacked.

My results alone do not provide conclusive evidence of hidden hyper-valuation of racial identity among whites: racial minority status was a *positive* predictor of identity valuation during two of my three tests and this supported my primary starting hypothesis. However, I do also find that Caucasian status was a positive predictor of identity valuation during my one covert test, and at least 60% of Caucasians were unwilling to change race during all tests. If Caucasians in fact display levels of in-group identification and identity valuation similar to those for other groups, and feel constrained from expressing this, an honest national discourse on race needs to tackle this problem along with issues facing minority groups. To do otherwise will risk allowing bigots to achieve prominence by focusing on truths and half-truths others dare not speak aloud.

Interestingly, African Americans displayed rates of identity valuation nearly on par with those for Caucasians during Survey C, with roughly 75% of all Black respondents remaining unwilling to change race. The difference between this and the Caucasian rate did reach significance in a univariate means test ($p = .016$), but the difference in actual willingness to change race was less than 12%. Interestingly, the percentage of African Americans willing to change their race was remarkably consistent across Survey A, Survey A 2.0, and Survey C – varying between 19% and 26%. This is itself a significant finding, in that it rebuts the hypothesis that oppression causes many or most Blacks to devalue their racial identities (Hacker, 1995; Harris, 1993; Tatum, 1997). Overall, African Americans were less likely than whites to change their race during two tests, and slightly but significantly more likely to do so during a third. This finding that consistently high levels of honestly stated racial identity valuation exist among Blacks gels with the concept of oppositional African American identities centered on Linked Fate (Block, 2011; Dawson, 2001; Simein, 2005).

List Experiment results for Hispanic and Asian respondents diverged sharply from results for both white and Black Americans, with the latter two groups displaying dramatically reduced levels of racial identity valuation during the List Experiment. As noted in the Results section, fully 55% of Asians to complete Survey C were willing to change their race, along with 44% of Hispanic respondents. The literature dealing with immigrant-origin minorities may help explain this unexpected result. As opposed to members of native-born minority groups who often construct oppositional identities during decades of conflict (Dawson, 2001; Simein, 2005), immigrant-origin minorities often identify with mainstream American culture and seek social assimilation (Hacker, 1992; McClain et al, 2009; McWhorter, 2000; Sowell, 1994). The archetype of the assimilation-seeking immigrant is so prevalent, indeed, that a question commonly used to test attitudes toward Blacks is: “Irish, Italians, Jews, and many other minorities overcame discrimination and worked their way up – should African Americans do the same without any special favors (Speakman & Moskowitz, 2009, p. 8)?” Although I did not hypothesize that this would be the case, my empirical data indicate that this archetype - like many other “stereotypes” - contains more than a kernel of truth.

Several other points of interest involve interactions between respondents' other personal identities and the valuation of race. For example, in light of the pre-existing political science literature, it is notable that the effect of conservatism on racial identity valuation is positive for minority as well as white conservatives. A consistent theme in the literature dealing with American race relations is the idea that minority conservatives are self-hating dupes (D'Souza, 1995; Foskett, 2004; McWhorter, 2000; Riley, 2014; Sowell, 2005; Steele, 1993). This heuristic is so prevalent that the names of leading ethnic conservatives, such as "Shelby Steele" or Clarence Thomas, can literally be used as synonyms for "sell-out" in middle-class Black or Latino discourse (McWhorter, 2000, p. 3). However, the influence of both increasing personal conservatism and increasingly conservative partisan affiliation on valuation was in a positive direction in all linear and logistic regressions run among minority respondents during Survey A. During predicted probabilities runs, the median Black or Latino member of the Green Party – the most liberal partisan affiliation provided to respondents as an option – was 15.31% likely to alter her race, but the median minority Republican was only 5.22% likely to change his. Among minority respondents, being liberal rather than conservative in terms of partisan affiliation increased a median respondent's likelihood of agreeing to change his or her race by 300%. These results strongly indicate that there is no negative correlation between conservatism and devaluation of minority racial identities.

In a different direction, results for the very disparate impact of age on identity valuation among whites and minorities also merit comment. Age was a factor variable of some interest to me, given the recent scholarly discourse about whether the United States is becoming a "post-racial" society (Donovan, 2010; Lewis-Beck, Tien, & Nadeau, 2010; Plant & DeVine, 2009), with this move driven by younger age cohorts (Ansolabhere & Stewart, 2009; Redlawsk, 2011). As discussed in the Methods section of the paper, I do find a strong and statistically significant correlation between younger age and decreased valuation of racial identity among Caucasian respondents to Survey A, a conclusion which would appear to provide support for the post-racial thesis. However increasing age was not a significant positive predictor of identity valuation among all respondents, despite the variable's strong showing among the Caucasian sub-population. In a sentence, the reason for this was that increasing age had a *negative* impact on the valuation racial identity among Blacks and other minorities, which was substantively sizable and came fairly close to standard levels of statistical significance.

While this relationship did not in fact reach significance and will not be discussed at great length, the effect of increasing age on identity valuation was negative in both the minorities-only linear and logistic regressions, with this influence approaching significance at the .200-level in the linear model. When the respondent data pool was analyzed using predicted probabilities, the median minority respondent under 20 was less than 7% likely to change his race and the median respondent between the ages of 20 and 30 was less than 10% likely to do so. However, the median respondent between 30 and 40 was 13.74% likely to change race, the median respondent between 40 and 50 was 19.30% likely to change, and the median respondent between 50 and 60 was 25.67% likely to do so. The typical minority respondent over the age of 60 was 31.74% likely to change his race. Thus, the median Black or Latino respondent in the oldest measured age category was nearly 25% more likely than an under-20 peer to change their race, while the median white respondent in the oldest measured category was 30% *less* likely to change their race than a younger peer.

Unlike those for whites, minority-specific results that indicate a positive correlation between younger age and increasing valuation of race do not initially appear to support the post-racial hypothesis. However, given the usual positive correlation between increasing age and resistance to change (Herek, 2003; Pike, 2004) – which I specifically observed for both minorities and whites during the List Experiment – the probable explanation for these atypical results is that identity devaluation by minority group members is decreasing in frequency as American racism lessens in intensity. While I did not expect to find it in the United States of today, identity devaluation certainly can occur during periods of intense oppression or violence (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006; Stern, 1995), and it is not seriously disputed that minority groups endured brutal oppression during much of America's historical past (D'Souza, 1995; Dawson, 1994; Hacker, 1995; Harris, 1993; Tatum, 1997; McClain et al, 2009). My Survey A results indicate that identity devaluation did occur in the past among some members of American minority groups, but that minority valuation of racial identities has now stabilized at levels close to those recorded for whites. For example, I observe only a 6% difference in levels of change willingness for median white and minority respondents across my younger three age cohorts.

Future research results will support the post-racial thesis if, from that relatively stable base, levels of racial identity valuation and of bigotry continue to decline for both white and minority members of future youth cohorts when other variables are controlled for. An interesting alternate hypothesis is that, given the combination of white reluctance to honestly discuss racial issues (Kuklinski, Cobb, & Gilens, 1997; Kuklinski et al, 1997; Krysan & Couper, 2003; McIntyre, 2002; Speakman & Moskowitz, 2009) and the participation of many minority students in grievance-based programs of affective education (D'Souza, 1995; Gross, 1999; Hoff-Sommers, 2000; Sowell, 1993; Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003), stated levels of racial identity valuation may continue to decrease for whites while continuing to increase for Blacks and other minorities. In either case, my mixed results for the age variable do not suffice to prove or rebut the post-racial thesis, but do suggest avenues of future research for other scholars.

Limitations, Future Research, and Concluding Remarks

The question of how and why people value their racial identities is an important one for the discipline of political science and for the social sciences overall (Block, 2011; Chong & Rogers, 2005; Hacker, 1995; Horowitz, 2000; Tatum 1997). However, the experiment outlined in this paper was one of the first empirical American tests of the actual measurable values placed by individual respondents on their race, and additionally of whether minority status negatively impacts this sort of identity valuation. As the last sentence of the previous section indicates, more work in this area remains to be done. In addition to the studies of the potentially post-racial nature of modern American society which I suggested above, I encourage scholars engaged by my results first to attempt superior versions of this project. Ideally, my results here will be replicated – or debunked – among a much larger-N sample of respondents selected completely at random from among a population not composed largely of college students. Snowball or purposive sampling conducted among younger populations, who often provide scholars with captive audiences willing to participate in “edgy” research, are a near normal in the study of ethnicity and gender concepts (Charles, 2003; Chen, 1999; Hacker, 1995; Jordan & Deluty, 1999; Meyer, 1995; Rockquemore, 2002; Wilkins, 2004). However, this is not methodologically ideal and constitutes a limitation of this paper; “undergraduates aren’t people,” as perhaps every crotchety Methods professor has noted at some point.

Second, the idea of empirically testing and comparing levels of group identity valuation can and should be extended beyond race. It has been argued seriously that women (Hoff-Sommers, 2000; Mackie, 1983; Tatum, 1997), gays (Meyer, 1995), and even members of religious minorities (Adorno, 1950; Harris, 2004) may devalue their in-group identities relative to members of the equivalent majority group, due to historical or contemporary oppression. To the best of my knowledge, none of these theses has been seriously tested using modern quantitative techniques. They should be. Third and finally, the question of *why* people value core characteristic identities like race must be asked in greater detail than my survey research methods allow. My instruments find strong and significant correlations between Linked Fate (among minorities), in-group identification, and conservatism on the one hand and racial identity valuation on the other. However, except for a short open-ended question at the end of Survey A, I do not test how those relationships operate for individual respondents. Focus groups or open-ended interviews with a sympathetic same-race interviewer might well be the best technique for unpacking – for example – the complex views of white identity held by Caucasian respondents, which almost certainly caused the dichotomy between my Survey A and Survey C instruments in white rates of willingness to change race.

Moving to the conclusions of this project, analysis of the effect of race and other characteristics on racial identity valuation supported some of my initial hypotheses while challenging others. Most importantly, racial minority status proved not to be a negative predictor of racial identity valuation during two of my three survey administrations. List Experiment results do indicate that contemporary American whites may continue to understand the “value” of their racial identity (Hacker, 1995; Harris, 1993; Tatum, 1997), but be most comfortable discussing this under covert conditions (Kuklinski, Cobb, & Gilens, 1997; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Speakman & Moskowitz, 2009; Streb, Burrell, Frederick, & Genovese, 2008). However – directly *contra* Hacker (1992, 1995) and similar authors – I found that no more than 25% of the largest minority group surveyed (African Americans) would consent to racial changes even under List conditions and that racial minority status was in fact a positive predictor of valuation during all non-List tests. My hypotheses concerning the overall positive impact of group identification, personal ideology, and partisan affiliation on valuation also received significant support. Hypotheses concerning the impact of age (among whites), and Linked Fate (among minorities) on valuation received partial support.

However, several findings were not as expected. I hypothesized that increasing age would correlate positively with identity valuation among all populations and was surprised to racial identity valuation instead to correlate with decreasing age among minorities and increasing age among whites. The effect of sex on valuation was wholly unexpected. I did not - to say the least - predict that female and particularly minority female respondents would be on average less willing to change their race than men. Overall, however, most of my hypotheses were confirmed during the majority of my tests. Most simply put, both whites and members of minority groups demanded more compensation than Dr. Hacker's famed \$50 million to change their race, and minorities usually demanded more compensation than whites.

Digging in the Texts: A Nearly Full List of Sources

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Appendix A: The Survey A/Survey A 2.0 Instrument

Cover Letter and Explanation: Please Read

Students:

I am a PhD student at SIU-C, and I am doing research in which I would like you to participate. Specifically, I am testing how different individuals feel about some aspects of their personal backgrounds. If you choose to participate in this study, please fill out the attached questionnaire. Doing so should take about eight to ten minutes.

I have chosen university students as the subjects for this survey, because I believe college men and women are generally used to discussing issues like this – and are comfortable enough with personal opinions not to have a negative experience filling out this survey. In addition to your class, this survey will be administered in a number of other classroom and professional settings.

This is a voluntary study. If you do not feel like participating, simply do not answer the survey questions and hand in the survey un-done. No extra credit is being assigned for participation in this project and no points will be lost by students who do not participate. For those who do participate, no records of the names or answers of participants will be kept. Please **do not** write your name or personal identification on the survey blank. If you are under 18, please – as was requested at the beginning of class – **do not** complete this survey.

If you have questions about this project, I can be contacted as: Wilfred T. Reilly, 209 North Springer Street (# 2), Carbondale IL 62901. My business phone is (618) 303-6525, and my e-mail is wreilly2003@yahoo.com. The faculty mentor supervising this project is Dr. Stephen Shulman of the Department of Political Science. Dr. Shulman's business address is: Faner Hall, Room 3063, Carbondale IL 62901. His business phone is (618) 453-3194 and his e-mail is shulman@siu.edu.

This project has been reviewed and approved by the SIUC Human Subjects Committee. Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this project may be addressed to the Committee Chairperson, Office of Research Development and Administration, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale IL 62901-4709. The e-mail here is siuhsc@siu.edu.

Thank you.

1. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I have a strong sense of belonging to the group of people that share my race (i.e. Black, white, Asian, Middle Eastern, Hispanic/Latino, or Native American)."
 - a.) _____ I strongly agree
 - b.) _____ I somewhat agree
 - c.) _____ I somewhat disagree
 - d.) _____ I strongly disagree
 - e.) _____ I don't really know
2. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I feel a strong attachment toward the group of people that share my race."
 - a.) _____ I strongly agree
 - b.) _____ I somewhat agree
 - c.) _____ I somewhat disagree
 - d.) _____ I strongly disagree
 - e.) _____ I don't really know
3. How much do you think that what happens generally in this country to people that share your religion (i.e. Protestant Christian, Muslim, Catholic, Jewish, atheist/agnostic) will affect your life?
 - a.) _____ It won't affect me at all
 - b.) _____ It will affect me slightly
 - c.) _____ It will affect me a fair amount
 - d.) _____ It will affect me a great deal
 - e.) _____ I don't really know how much it will affect me
4. If it were fully possible, how much money – if any – would you require to permanently change your biological sex (i.e. male, female)? If you change, you will still have your own personality and memories. However, you will be a man if you are now a woman, and a woman if you are now a man.
 - a.) _____ I would change this for free
 - b.) _____ I would change this for \$25 million or less
 - c.) _____ I would change this for between \$25 and \$50 million
 - d.) _____ I would change this for between \$50 and \$75 million
 - e.) _____ I would change this for between \$75 and \$100 million
 - f.) _____ I would change this only for more than \$100 million
 - g.) _____ I would never change this
 - h.) _____ I don't really know if I would change this

5. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have a strong sense of belonging to the group of people that share my religion.”
 - a.) _____ I strongly agree
 - b.) _____ I somewhat agree
 - c.) _____ I somewhat disagree
 - d.) _____ I strongly disagree
 - e.) _____ I don’t really know

6. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I feel a strong attachment toward the group of people that share my biological sex.”
 - a.) _____ I strongly agree
 - b.) _____ I somewhat agree
 - c.) _____ I somewhat disagree
 - d.) _____ I strongly disagree
 - e.) _____ I don’t really know

7. How much do you think that what happens generally in this country to people that share your race will affect your life?
 - a.) _____ It won’t affect me at all
 - b.) _____ It will affect me slightly
 - c.) _____ It will affect me a fair amount
 - d.) _____ It will affect me a great deal
 - e.) _____ I don’t really know how much it will affect me

8. If it were possible, how much money – if any – would you require to permanently change your sexual orientation (i.e. gay, straight, bisexual)? If you change, you will still have your personality and memories. However, you will be gay if you are now straight and straight if you are now gay or bisexual.
 - a.) _____ I would change this for free
 - b.) _____ I would change this for \$25 million or less
 - c.) _____ I would change this for between \$25 and \$50 million
 - d.) _____ I would change this for between \$50 and \$75 million
 - e.) _____ I would change this for between \$75 and \$100 million
 - f.) _____ I would change this only for more than \$100 million
 - g.) _____ I would never change this
 - h.) _____ I don’t really know if I would change this

9. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: “I have a strong sense of belonging to the group of people that share my biological sex.”
 - a.) _____ I strongly agree
 - b.) _____ I somewhat agree
 - c.) _____ I somewhat disagree
 - d.) _____ I strongly disagree
 - e.) _____ I don’t really know

10. How much do you think that what happens generally in this country to people that share your sexual orientation will affect your life?
 - a.) _____ It won’t affect me at all
 - b.) _____ It will affect me slightly
 - c.) _____ It will affect me a fair amount
 - d.) _____ It will affect me a great deal
 - e.) _____ I don’t really know how much it will affect me

11. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I feel a strong attachment toward the group of people that share my religion."
- _____ I strongly agree
 - _____ I somewhat agree
 - _____ I somewhat disagree
 - _____ I strongly disagree
 - _____ I don't really know
12. If it were possible, how much money – if any – would you require to permanently change your race? If you change, you will still have your personality and memories. However, you will be White if you are a member of any non-white minority group, and Black if you are White.
- _____ I would change this for free
 - _____ I would change this for \$25 million or less
 - _____ I would change this for between \$25 and \$50 million
 - _____ I would change this for between \$50 and \$75 million
 - _____ I would change this for between \$75 and \$100 million
 - _____ I would change this only for more than \$100 million
 - _____ I would never change this
 - _____ I don't really know if I would change this
13. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I have a strong sense of belonging to the group of people that share my sexual orientation."
- _____ I strongly agree
 - _____ I somewhat agree
 - _____ I somewhat disagree
 - _____ I strongly disagree
 - _____ I don't really know
14. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I feel a strong attachment toward the group of people that share my sexual orientation."
- _____ I strongly agree
 - _____ I somewhat agree
 - _____ I somewhat disagree
 - _____ I strongly disagree
 - _____ I don't really know
15. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I have high Self-esteem."
- _____ I strongly agree
 - _____ I somewhat agree
 - _____ I am neutral about this
 - _____ I somewhat disagree
 - _____ I strongly disagree
 - _____ I don't really know
16. How much do you think what happens generally in this country to people that share your biological sex will affect your life?
- _____ It won't affect me at all
 - _____ It will affect me slightly
 - _____ It will affect me a fair amount
 - _____ It will affect me a great deal
 - _____ I don't really know how much it will affect me

17. If it were possible, how much money – if any – would you require to permanently change your religion? If you change, you will still be yourself. However, you will be a Protestant Christian if you are Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, or atheist/agnostic. You will be a Jewish American if you are a Protestant Christian.
- a.) _____ I would change this for free
 - b.) _____ I would change this for less than \$25 million
 - c.) _____ I would change this for between \$25 and \$50 million
 - d.) _____ I would change this for between \$50 and \$75 million
 - e.) _____ I would change this for between \$75 and \$100 million
 - f.) _____ I would change this only for more than \$100 million
 - g.) _____ I would never change this
 - h.) _____ I don't really know if I would change this
18. What is your biological sex?
- a.) _____ Female
 - b.) _____ Male
19. What is your primary sexual orientation?
- a.) _____ Heterosexual
 - b.) _____ Bisexual
 - c.) _____ Lesbian or gay
20. If you identified as lesbian or gay, how open are you about your sexuality?
- a.) _____ Not open: virtually no one knows that I am gay
 - b.) _____ Not very open: some friends and intimates know
 - c.) _____ Somewhat open: many people know; many don't
 - d.) _____ Pretty open: most people know
 - e.) _____ Totally open: almost everyone knows
21. What is the highest level of education you have completed so far?
- a.) _____ Less than high school
 - b.) _____ High school
 - c.) _____ Community or two-year college
 - d.) _____ Four year college: any undergraduate degree
 - e.) _____ Any graduate degree
22. How would you describe your ideological position, on political and social issues?
- a.) _____ Liberal
 - b.) _____ Moderate
 - c.) _____ Conservative
23. What political party do you most identify with?
- a.) _____ Democratic
 - b.) _____ Republican
 - c.) _____ Green
 - d.) _____ Other third party
 - e.) _____ No party
24. What is the racial category that best describes you?
- a.) _____ Black/African descent
 - b.) _____ Caucasian
 - c.) _____ Hispanic or Latino
 - d.) _____ Asian or Pacific Islander
 - e.) _____ Middle Eastern descent
 - f.) _____ Native American or Native Alaskan

25. What is your current age?
- a.) _____ 20 or under
 - b.) _____ 21-30
 - c.) _____ 31-40
 - d.) _____ 41-50
 - e.) _____ 51-60
 - f.) _____ Older than 60
26. What is your religious faith?
- a.) _____ Atheist or agnostic
 - b.) _____ Protestant Christian
 - c.) _____ Catholic Christian
 - d.) _____ Jewish
 - e.) _____ Muslim
 - f.) _____ Other faith
27. How would you describe your current work status?
- a.) _____ I do not work currently
 - b.) _____ I work occasionally
 - c.) _____ I have a part-time job
 - d.) _____ I have a full-time job
28. In response to the questions on this survey about changing things – your race, sex, sexual preference, and religion – why did you answer as you did? What made you say that you would or would not change, and/or give the dollar amount you did?

Appendix B: All Survey A Methodological Models

Table One: Population Size and Rates of Change Willingness by Race (Survey A)¹

Valuation Level	Whites	All Racial Minorities	Blacks	Hispanics	Asians
Number/Percentage Willing to Change Identity for Free	6 (.02) (N=307)	7 (.05) (N=137)	3 (.03) (N=87)	2 (.07) (N=29)	1 (.07) (N=14)
For \$25 Million or Less	40 (.13)	8 (.06)	5 (.06)	0	2 (.14)
For \$25-50 Million	17 (.06)	3 (.02)	2 (.02)	1 (.04)	0
For \$50-75 Million	13 (.04)	3 (.02)	2 (.02)	0	1 (.07)
For \$75-100 Million	10 (.03)	1 (.01)	1 (.01)	0	0
For \$100 Million-Plus	33 (.11)	12 (.09)	5 (.06)	5 (.17)	1 (.07)
Number/Percentage Unwilling to Ever Change Identity	188 (.61)	103 (.75)	69 (.79)	21 (.72)	9 (.64)
Mean Level (1-7) of Compensation Asked For Identity Changes/ Standard Deviation	5.71 (1.95)	6.15 (1.80)*	6.26 (1.69)*	6.27 (1.67)	5.57 (2.28)

¹ In all models appearing in this chapter, significance is measured using “stars” thus: one star indicates significance at the .05 level, two stars indicate significance at the .01 level, and three stars indicate significance at the .001 level. Stars appearing next to the mean response rates for minority group respondents indicate the significance of the difference between these mean response rates and the mean response rate for majority group respondents. Also, responses from a total of (7) Middle Eastern and Native American respondents are included in the “All inority Respondents” column but are not independently analyzed in a column of this table.

Table Two: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Racial Change (All)²

Variable	Coefficient (S.E)
Minority Race	.545 (.225)*
Self-Esteem	-.003 (.088)
Group Identification	.383 (.114)***
Linked Fate Level	.114 (.101)
Personal Ideology	.139 (.148)
Partisan Affiliation	.197 (.092)*
Sex	.351 (.198)
Sexual Orientation	-.257 (.250)
Religious Background	-.053 (.196)
Education Level	-.141 (.112)
Income/Job Status	-.061 (.092)
Age	.155 (.150)
R2 = .099	
Number of Observations = 402	

Table Three: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Racial Change (Whites)

Variable	Coefficient (S.E)
Self-Esteem	-.059 (.115)
Group Identification	.439 (.137)**
Linked Fate Level	.081 (.129)
Personal Ideology	.203 (.197)
Partisan Affiliation	.195 (.106)
Sex	.277 (.252)
Sexual Orientation	-.014 (.339)
Religious Background	.088 (.248)
Education Level	-.183 (.144)
Income/Job Status	-.024 (.114)
Age	.350 (.192)
R2 = .092	
Number of Observations = 276	

² As is standard in the discipline, in my regression models one asterisk “star” represents significance at the .05 level. Two stars represent significance at the .01 level; three stars represent significance at the .001 level.

Table Four: Mean Rates of List Experiment Response by Racial Group³

Mean Response	Caucasians	All Minorities	Blacks	Hispanics	Asians
Survey B Mean/ Standard Deviation	1.68 (.95) (N=181)	1.28 (1) (72)	1.23 (1.1) (40)	1.56 (.73) (9)	1 (.96) (14)
Survey C Mean/ Standard Deviation	1.82 (1.24) (N = 171)	1.57 (1.2) (82)	1.49 (1.22) (53)	2 (1.06) (15)	1.55 (1.29) (11)
Survey B/Survey C: Difference in Mean Items Selected	.14	.29***	.26	.44	.55

Table Five: Linear Regression – Survey A Compensation for Racial Change (Minorities)

Variable	Coefficient (S.E)
Self-Esteem	.092 (.131)
Group Identification	.200 (.209)
Linked Fate Level	.529 (.161)***
Personal Ideology	.158 (.231)
Partisan Affiliation	.160 (.228)
Sex	.522 (.315)
Sexual Orientation	-.497 (.357)
Religious Background	.053 (.312)
Education Level	-.021 (.177)
Income/Job Status	-.091 (.153)
Age	-.252 (.239)
R2 = .185	
Number of Observations = 126	

³ In all models appearing in this chapter, significance is measured using “stars” thus: one star indicates significance at the .05 level, two stars indicate significance at the .01 level, and three stars indicate significance at the .001 level. What is being tested is whether or not between-group differences in the increased number of mean answers for my identity questions between Survey B and Survey C – which exactly indicate the level of willingness to change identity for each group – are statistically significant. The data in Figure One was generated using Question Three on List Experiment surveys B and C.

Table Six: Logistic Regression – Survey A Yes/No Chance of Racial Change (All Respondents)

Variable	Coefficient (S.E)
Minority Status	-.810 (.277)**
Self-Esteem	-.056 (.103)
Group Identification	-.425 (.134)**
Linked Fate Level	-.013 (.122)
Personal Ideology	-.349 (.181)
Partisan Affiliation	-.094 (.109)
Sex	-.516 (.241)*
Sexual Orientation	.251 (.293)
Religious Background	.103 (.235)
Education Level	.175 (.135)
Income/Job Status	-.056 (.111)
Age	-.327 (.194)
R2 = .085	
Number of Observations = 403	

Table Seven: Logistic Regression – Survey A Yes/No Chance of Racial Change (Whites)

Variable	Coefficient (S.E)
Self-Esteem	.033 (.127)
Group Identification	-.416 (.153)*
Linked Fate Level	.141 (.144)
Personal Ideology	-.403 (.219)
Partisan Affiliation	-.068 (.119)
Sex	-.310 (.284)
Sexual Preference	.080 (.367)
Religious Background	.209 (.275)
Education Level	.247 (.161)
Income/Job Status	-.083 (.127)
Age	-.485 (.229)*
R2 = .067	
Number of Observations = 275	

Table Eight: Survey A - Yes/No Chance of Racial Change (Minorities)

Variable	Coefficient (S.E)
Self-Esteem	-.261 (.196)
Group Identification	-.565 (.309)
Linked Fate Level	-.522 (.262)*
Personal Ideology	-.395 (.391)
Partisan Affiliation	-.457 (.388)
Sex	-1.248 (.525)*
Sexual Preference	.296 (.575)
Religious Background	-.225 (.499)
Education Level	-.231 (.302)
Income/Job Status	.014 (.244)
Age	.289 (.410)
R2 = .163	
Number of Observations = 126	

Table Nine: Survey A Probabilities of Racial Change (All Respondents)

Variable Level	Chance of Racial Change
White	43.94%
Non-White	26.33%
Male	43.94%
Female	32.68%
Straight Respondent	43.94%
Bi-Sexual	50.14%
Gay Respondent	58.89%
Protestant Christian	41.29%
Any Religious Minority	43.94%
High School Education	39.69%
College Bachelor's Degree	48.35%
Graduate Collegiate Degree	52.73%
Ideologically Liberal	52.60%
Ideologically Moderate	43.94%
Ideologically Conservative	35.84%
Green Party Member	46.23%
Democratic Party Member	43.94%
Republican Party Member	39.48%
Respondent 20-30	43.94%
Respondent 30-40	36.63%
Respondent 40-50	30.28%
Unemployed Respondent	46.78%
Stable Part-Time Job	43.94%
Full-Time Job	42.59%
Low Racial Group Identification	60.08%
High Racial Group identification	25.77%
Low Linked Fate	44.47%
High Linked Fate	43.74%
Low Self Esteem	47.88%
Moderate Self Esteem	45.24%
High Self Esteem	42.68%

Table Ten: Survey A Probabilities of Racial Change (Whites)

Variable Level	Chance of Racial Change
Male	38.86%
Female	31.71%
Straight Respondent	38.86%
Bi-Sexual	41.00%
Gay Respondent	43.40%
Protestant Christian	34.42%
Any Religious Minority	38.86%
High School Education	33.32%
College Bachelor's Degree	44.86%
Graduate Collegiate Degree	50.93%
Ideologically Liberal	48.71%
Ideologically Moderate	38.86%
Ideologically Conservative	30.06%
Green Party Member	42.01%
Democratic Party Member	40.40%
Republican Party Member	36.03%
Respondent 20-30	38.86%
Respondent 30-40	28.38%
Respondent 40-50	20.44%
Unemployed Respondent	43.87%
Stable Part-Time Job	38.86%
Full-Time Job	36.55%
Low Racial Group Identification	59.03%
High Racial Group identification	22.33%
Low Linked Fate	35.69%
High Linked Fate	45.72%
Low Self Esteem	36.96%
Moderate Self Esteem	38.13%
High Self Esteem	39.67%

Table Eleven: Survey A Probabilities of Racial Change (Minorities)

Variable Level	Chance of Racial Change
Male	25.29%
Female	9.87%
Straight Respondent	9.87%
Bi-Sexual	13.40%
Gay Respondent	19.38%
Protestant Christian	11.69%
Any Religious Minority	9.87%
High School Education	9.87%
College Bachelor's Degree	6.76%
Graduate Collegiate Degree	6.15%
Ideologically Liberal	13.80%
Ideologically Moderate	9.87%
Ideologically Conservative	7.66%
Green Party Member	15.31%
Democratic Party Member	9.87%
Republican Party Member	5.22%
Respondent 20-30	9.87%
Respondent 30-40	13.74%
Respondent 40-50	19.30%
Unemployed Respondent	9.87%
Stable Part-Time Job	9.99%
Full-Time Job	10.35%
Low Racial Group Identification	36.46%
High Racial Group identification	6.52%
Low Linked Fate	23.00%
High Linked Fate	6.58%
Low Self Esteem	20.08%
Moderate Self Esteem	12.50%
High Self Esteem	7.93%