

Methodological Issues in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction: Lessons for Nigeria

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Abstract

The burgeoning incidence of armed conflicts, their internalized identities and collateral damage have made peacebuilding and reconstruction inevitable for the United Nations and multilateral organizations to promote peace around the world. Despite the volume of resources invested into peacebuilding in war-torn societies, success is not a guarantee. However, methods developed to guide peacebuilding projects are significant issues that underpin the process of implementation. Thus, peacebuilding methods and the challenges that often circumvent their usage were examined to bring out instructive lessons for building peace in the northeast, which was decimated by Boko Haram.

Key words: Peacebuilding, Reconstruction, Boko Haram, Violent conflict, Methodology

Introduction

The collapse of the cold war brought dramatic changes to international politics. One of the effects of the war was the transformation of inter-state conflicts into intra-state conflicts. In other words, conflicts acquired internal identity as a result of the events that evolved during the cold war. In Africa, where the incident was common, serious security challenges were thrown up, which further complicated the existing problems especially in the humanitarian circle, where new patterns and scales of displacement were generated on a constant basis. The incidence of intra-state crises fueled lawlessness, chaos and criminality in the continent. Wessels (2009) was of the opinion that “the mass displacement and hardships of war shatter communities, reducing people to a state of desperate competition over necessities such as food, water, and shelter. As social cohesion plummets and norms of law and order and other social controls weaken, the doors open ever wider to spreading violence and lawlessness”. To contend with these challenges, the United Nations moved beyond its original mandate of helping to prevent and end wars between member states and begun to intervene directly within member states to help them end armed intrastate conflicts and to rebuild their war-torn countries and collapsed institutions (Der Schulenburg, 2014). The point is that the 21st Century created undue pressure for the United Nations as a result of the devastating impacts of armed violence around the world. This development necessitated the integration of peacebuilding and reconstruction as components of the operations of the United Nations in order to achieve its core mandate. The complexities and severities of intrastate violence made peacebuilding and reconstruction to progressively evolve into consensus programmes of action for the United Nations and other multinational organizations interested in promoting a culture of peace around the world. Therefore, the quest for peacebuilding and reconstruction in Nigeria is as a result of the devastating consequences of the attacks conducted by Boko Haram in the northeastern part of the country.

Boko Haram was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, and resorted to the use of violence as a means of communication in 2009. Since the Islamic sect went violent, Nigeria has been under siege by its indiscriminate attacks. The insurgency claimed thousands of lives with even a greater number maimed; ravaged the outlying communities as well as rendering them desolate in the northeast. Also, economic, social, and political activities were paralyzed in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, with deleterious consequences on the lives and livelihoods of the people. Women and children constituted 70% of the internally displaced persons (IDPs). Boko Haram attacks have had very negative effect on the trust and oneness among different community members, creating the need for reconciliation and relational peacebuilding. However, close to the end of 2015, military actions and civilian resistance started to yield fruits, as the violent Islamic sect has progressively been degraded. To consolidate the progress so far recorded in the fight against Boko Haram, post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction are considered imperative to heal and reconcile individuals and groups and to rebuild communities in the northeast. Basically, peacebuilding and reconstruction are essential tools for the restoration of interpersonal relationships and the rebuilding of facilities destroyed as well as reforming the security systems in communities in order to restore peace, law and order and to prevent the relapse of conflict in the affected regions. It is obvious that to achieve peace and stability in the northeast will require a critical appraisal of what has been done elsewhere in order to bring about the needed understanding in terms of what to do, why, how and when to do it. Thus, the essence of this article is to peruse the methodological issues that underpin the adoption of peacebuilding and reconstruction programmes by the United Nations and other independent bodies for the purpose of determining the possibility of employing lessons learnt in rebuilding North East, Nigeria.

Peacebuilding: Historical Brief and Conceptualization

Peacebuilding is one of the United Nations' programmes that have been extensively employed even by nations, regional and international organizations as well as NGOs for creating structures that will ensure the attainment and sustenance of peace in societies just rescinding from war. The term was coined over 30 years ago in the work of Johan Galtung, who called for the creation of peacebuilding structures to promote sustainable peace by addressing the "root causes" of violent conflicts and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution (United Nations, 2010). In 1992, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali popularized the concept in his "Agenda for Peace". The document made peacebuilding an integral programme of the United Nations for the restoration of peace and security in war-torn societies. Thus, peacebuilding became a dominant activity of nations, regional and international organizations for the achievement of peace and its sustainability. Conceptualizing peacebuilding is tinted with complexities which have hindered the emergence of a consensus definition and a trouble-free pattern of applicability. Cousens (2001) contented that peacebuilding is difficult to define and even more difficult to achieve in practice. This idea insightfully revealed that peacebuilding has enjoyed considerable attention by scholars to the extent that making a choice of a particular definition to justify real life situation may be confusing and practically difficult. In 2000, the Brahimi Report described peacebuilding as "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war".

The Secretary-General's Policy Committee in 2007 considered peacebuilding as: "a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development". Thus, peacebuilding involves activities that will ensure the achievement of sustainable peace by ensuring that the root causes and effects of conflict are addressed "through reconciliation, institution building and political as well as economic transformation" (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). These descriptions revealed that peacebuilding comprises of a set of activities that are based on physical, economic, social and structural initiatives which are essential for the restoration of peace and stability in war-torn societies. Peacebuilding activities can be categorized into pre-conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding. Post-conflict phase of peacebuilding involves "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The pre-conflict peacebuilding efforts are centered on setting in motion activities capable of tracking and detecting conflict early before it escalates into violent conflict. The central goal of peacebuilding is to restore peace, through the establishment of structures capable of detecting and responding early and appropriately to emerging conflict.

Peacebuilding is a social construct that intends to, ``generates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. It involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords (Lederach, 1997). It is important to note that concerns such as addressing root causes of violent conflict; institutional building and development of peace structures; individual and intergroup capacity development; building trust and group reconciliation and restoration of law and order are issues crucial to peacebuilding. These concerns are dynamic and vary from place to place, depending on the devastating consequences of a crisis. However, they are significant issues in peacebuilding operations that determine its success or failure in crises riddled societies.

Post-conflict Reconstruction: An Evolution and Description

Post-conflict reconstruction is a concept invented in the 18th century, but gained currency in the 19th century due to the ever-increasing devastation of violent conflicts. According to Williams (2005), the intellectual and practical origins of the modern meaning of reconstruction are traced to the rebuilding of the South after the defeat of the Confederacy in 1863 and in the discussions about the controversial role of Northern businessmen. The first in the history of international post-war reconstruction effort was carried out in Austria after the end of the First World War. It was undertaken by the League of Nations and was based on the work and the suggestions of a fact-finding economic commission (Tzifakis, n.d). Austrian reconstruction entailed the suspension of reparation payments, the initiation of economic reforms and the appointment of a High Commissioner for the country's economy. A similar but less extensive work was subsequently carried out in Hungary, while the third international reconstruction programme of the interwar period focused on the repatriation of expelled ethnic Greeks from Turkey after the 1922 war (Williams, 2005). According to Tzifakis (n.d),

the most impressive post-war reconstruction effort was carried out following the end of the Second World War. It concerns the work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration towards Europe and China (1943-1946), the loans of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development to Europe, the Marshall Plan for Western Europe (1948-1951) and the economic assistance to Japan. Of all these programs, the Marshall Plan stands out as the most successful initiative. It implied a transfer of \$13.3 billions of aid from the United States to Western Europe for the accomplishment of the following objectives: increase of production, expansion of foreign trade, enhancement of internal financial stability, and development of European economic cooperation. It was comprised mainly of grants in commodities and services plus technical assistance and its success has been largely attributed to its use of the instrument of conditionality for the implementation of structural adjustments (Tzifakis, n.d).

The programme achieved all of its targets as inflation, unemployment and budget deficits were significantly reduced, the GDP of the recipient states grew by 35% and intra-European trade increased by 80% (de Long and Eichengreen, 1993 and Lewarne and Snelbecker, 2004). The end of World War II and the emergence of the Cold War brought about a significant change in the conduct and administration of post-conflict reconstruction. The change was stimulated as a result of the fact that international politics was characterized by a bipolar system of operation. The politics weakened the operational efficiency of the Security Council in decision and policy making, consequently making reconstruction efforts a less important issue for action. However, the collapse of the Cold War, increased incidence of violent crises, the transmutation of conflicts from interstate to intrastate; and the fact that majority of the states emerging from armed conflicts were marked with the identity of weak or failed states syndrome coalesced to create the impetus for the activation of post-conflict reconstruction exercise. According to Tzifakis (n.d), indeed, it was the outbreak of several civil wars in the early 1990s that brought the post-conflict reconstruction theme back into the policy agenda. The complexities associated with crises in the post- Cold War and the drive for the United Nations to achieve its core mandate of maintaining international peace metamorphosed into the emergence of peacebuilding. Before then, the post-conflict reconstruction events were the order of the day and consisted mainly activities of the International Monetary Funds (IMF) and the World Bank.

Tzifakis (n.d) vividly captured the transformation that led to the establishment of Peacebuilding Commission in this way:

the special circumstances surrounding the reconstruction of weak or failed states induced the donor community to review its policy tools and methods. For instance, the IMF revised in 1995 its policy on emergency assistance in order to address the needs of countries in post-conflict situations. The World Bank established in 1997 a Post-Conflict Unit (later renamed to Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit) and a Post-Conflict Fund. The United Nations Development Programme founded in 2001 a Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery to work for the restoration of the quality of life of people who have been victims of natural disaster or violent conflict. The United Nations established in 2005 a Peacebuilding Commission (and a Peacebuilding Support Office and a Peacebuilding Fund) with the aim of bringing together and improving coordination among all relevant actors who get involved in a reconstruction effort (Tzifakis, n.d).

Thus, post-conflict reconstruction efforts start upon the cessation of a conflict. It begins by supporting the transition from conflict to peace in an affected country through the rebuilding of the country's socioeconomic framework (World Bank, 1998). It was reported further that post-conflict reconstruction “does not refer only to the reconstruction of "physical infrastructure," nor does it necessarily signify a rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework that existed before the onset of conflict”, but it involves “a reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society in the economy and society and in the framework of governance and rule of law” (World Bank, 1998). According to Hamre and Sullivan (2002), post-conflict reconstruction has to do with “providing and enhancing not only social and economic well-being and governance and the rule of law but also other elements of justice and reconciliation and, very centrally, security”. Therefore, post-conflict reconstruction has two overall objectives: to facilitate the transition to sustainable peace after hostilities have ceased and to support economic and social development (World Bank, 1998). To achieve these objectives, the major tasks or pillars which guide post-conflict reconstruction are:

- (i) Security: This has to do with all aspects of public safety, in particular, creating a safe and secure environment and developing legitimate and effective security institutions.
- (ii) Justice and reconciliation: These address the need to deal with past abuses through formal and informal mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from conflict and to create an impartial and accountable legal system for the future, in particular, creating an effective law enforcement apparatus, an open judicial system, fair laws, and a humane corrections system.
- (iii) Social and economic well-being: These involve the fundamental social and economic needs, in particular, providing emergency relief, restoring essential services to the population in areas such as health and education, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and initiating an inclusive and sustainable development programme.
- (iv) Governance and participation: These address the need to create legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes, in particular, establishing a representative constitutional structure, strengthening public-sector management and administration, and ensuring the active and open participation of civil society in the formulation of the country's government and its policies (Hamre and Sullivan, 2002).

The coherent execution of these tasks is essential for successful reconstruction efforts in any society coming out of armed violence. Kofi Annan(2002), a former United Nations Secretary General, validated this argument by that “all these tasks—humanitarian, military, political, social, and economic—are interconnected, and the people engaged in them need to work closely together. He stated further that we cannot expect lasting success in any of them unless we pursue all of them at once as part of a single coherent strategy. If the resources are lacking for any one of them, all the others may turn out to have been pursued in vain” (Kofi Annan, 2002).

Understanding the Nexus

Understanding the nexus between post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction is imperative in order to determine their approaches, scope and applicability dynamics. One thing that is clear in the literature, but may be misleading about these concepts is the fact that they are considered as synonymous.

Both terms are considered as post-conflict intervention that provides for parallel, concurrent and interlinked short-, medium- and long-term activities that work to prevent disputes from escalating, or avoid a relapse into violent conflict by addressing both the immediate consequence and the root causes of a conflict system (de Coning, 2008). Also, Call (2004) posited that peacebuilding is indiscriminately used to refer to preventive diplomacy, preventive development, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. However, some scholars see peacebuilding as a holistic concept that is more encompassing than post-conflict reconstruction. For instance, post-conflict reconstruction literature is overwhelmingly focused on the security and political dimensions of peacebuilding operations (Tzifakis, n.d). Equally, the majority of studies dealing with reconstruction address economic issues only tangentially, or as an afterthought, and with little economic rigor, specificity, or comprehensiveness (del Castillo, 2008). The encompassing nature of peacebuilding is based on the broadness of its scope. It addresses every aspect of a war torn society, be it social, economic, political, security, cultural, environmental and humanitarian issues that usually define the plight of a society that has experienced war. Post-conflict reconstruction is an exercise that is principally conducted by the World Bank or IMF, while peacebuilding is a United Nations programme of action. Although, both programmes allow for the participation of both internal and external actors in the process of execution, however, post-conflict reconstruction starts at the cessation of armed conflict, while pre-conflict peacebuilding is an integral component of peacebuilding activities, which is geared towards preventing conflict from escalating into violence. Thus, peacebuilding includes early warning and response efforts, violence prevention, advocacy work, civilian and military peacekeeping, military intervention, humanitarian assistance, ceasefire agreements and the establishment of peace zones (Aliff, 2014). Peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction are two mutually reinforcing initiatives aimed at rebuilding structures that will promote legitimate, accountable and responsive government in order to encourage a healthy and peaceful society. However, peacebuilding is the most widely used term because of its encompassing nature and the broadness of its scope.

Issues of Methodology in Peacebuilding and Reconstruction

The methods of peacebuilding and reconstruction are usually not straightjacketed. They depend on a number of factors such as the magnitude of destruction suffered by a country and the concerned bodies willing to render assistance. Thus, peacebuilding methods vary from one place to another, and in most cases the external donor plays a significant role in its determination. Suhrke, et al (2002) posited that there are no formulas suggesting which mission structure and strategies are most appropriate to sustain a framework for peacebuilding in different kinds of situations. For instance, the UN intervention in Cambodia and Somalia reflected variation in peacebuilding methods

Table 1 Peacebuilding Approaches for Cambodia and Somalia

Cambodia	Somalia
(i) Recognition of transitional government	(i) Reaching peace agreement
(ii) Facilitation of the return of refugees	(ii) Creation of transitional national council
(iii) Demobilization, disarmament and reintegration	(iii) Formulation of national reconciliation
(iv) Use of power-sharing mechanism	(iv) Institutional building
(v) Conduct of elections	(v) Promotion of civil society participation
(vi) Restoration of national government.	(vi) Economic recovery and rehabilitation
	(vii) Comprehensive programme of disarmament
	(viii) Reforming of security sector
	(ix) Establishment of national government.

Table 1 revealed the peacebuilding methods that guided the United Nations intervention in Cambodia and Somalia. There are considerable variations in the approaches adopted in the two countries. This was possibly based on the level of destruction that occurred, agenda of the donor organization and the amount of resources earmarked for the implementation of the projects. These issues are germane to the development of peacebuilding methodological framework in a country.

Table 2: Japan Peacebuilding Pillars

S/No	Peacebuilding Pillar	Activities of the Pillar
1	Reconstructing of social capital	(i) development of basic infrastructure, (ii) development of transport, electricity and communication infrastructure, (iii) enhancement of function of health facilities, (iv) enhancement of function of education systems, and (v) food security
2	Economic recovery	(i) development of economic environment, and (ii) increase of employment opportunities and income generation
3	Rebuilding the governing functions	(i) support of elections, (ii) support for media, (iii) legal and judicial development, (iv) development of democratic administrative institutions and (v) development of financial institutions
4	Security enhancement	(i) development of security sectors, (ii) demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, (iii) small arms control and (iv) control of landmine and UXO problems

Table 2 showed the peacebuilding method of Japan. Japan's peacebuilding activity is guided by the above pillars, which are the operational template for intervention as an international donor in peacebuilding operations. The method of intervention of Canada is different from that of Japan. The Canada Initiative defined peacebuilding as the efforts made before, during or after conflicts, which aim at enhancing the possibility of achieving peace and reduce the possibility of eruption of armed conflicts within a State (Small, 1999). The document further revealed that the peacebuilding imitative of Canada delineated into three approaches, namely: conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction. The point is that the methodological framework of an institution intervening, whether it is a country or an international organisation such as the United Nations, World Bank or regional organization such as OECD, NEPAD or NGOs are self-determined with implications for how peacebuilding is implemented. The OECD and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) peacebuilding and reconstruction frameworks are presented as follows.

Table 3. The peacebuilding strategy of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

S/No	Peacebuilding Methods	Element
1	Security Dimension	(i) Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into the local community (ii) Humanitarian mine action (iii) Improving control of small arms and light weapons (iv) Security system reform (SSR)
2	Governance and the Political Dimension	(i) Support for political and administrative authorities and structures (ii) commitment of political leaders, (iii) promotion of good governance, democracy and human rights (iv) Support to governments through civil society, media etc (v) legal action and truth commissions
3	Social, Economic and Environmental Dimension	(i) repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons (ii) Infrastructure and important government functions building (iii) promotion of lasting and sustainable peace through quick impact project and long-term development programme through education and health (iv) Stimulation of productive sector development, employment, trade and investment. (v) Technical and financial assistance

Table 3 outlined the OECD peacebuilding method. It involves a wide range of activities categorised into three major dimensions, detailing elements that form the fulcrum for intervention. Therefore, the methodological guide of any institution, whether regional or international organisation that seeks to engage in peacebuilding and reconstruction activities remain a paramount issue for the success of the programmes in a place.

Table 4: The Post-reconstruction strategy of NEPAD

S/No	Strategy	Emergency Phase	Transition Phase	Development Phase
1	Security	Establish a safe and secure environment	Develop legitimate and stable security institutions	Consolidate local capacity
2	Political Transition, Governance & Participation	Determine the governance structures, foundations for participation, and processes for political transition	Promote legitimate and stable security institutions	Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
3	Socio-economic Development	Provide for emergency humanitarian needs	Establish foundations, structures, and processes for development	Institutionalise long-term developmental programme
4	Human Rights, Justice and Reconciliation	Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	Build the legal system and processes for reconciliation and monitoring human rights	Established and functional legal system based on accepted international norms
5	Coordination and Management	Develop consultative and coordination mechanism for internal and external actors	Develop technical bodies to facilitate programme development	Develop internal sustainable processes and capacity for coordination

Table 4 revealed the post-conflict reconstruction method of NEPAD. It focused on five thematic areas which range from security to the establishment of platform for effective coordination and management of scheduled activities. It should be noted that the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 2009 identified five recurring priority areas which should form the core elements in the approaches to be adopted for international assistance in the conduct of peacebuilding activities. These elements are: support to basic safety and security; political processes; provision of basic services; restoration of core government functions; and economic revitalisation. What characterises the methodological frameworks is the fact that they reflect the dimensions of peacebuilding which are: the structural, relational, and personal dimensions. The structural dimension of peacebuilding call attention to the social, political and economic conditions built into the structure of a society that encourages the manifestation of violent conflict. The elements of the conditions are corruption, inequality, exploitation, discrimination, exclusion, injustice, poverty, unemployment, and prejudice. When these elements are deliberately or unintentionally constructed into the structure of a society, then violence becomes inevitable. The structural dimension of peacebuilding is essentially meant to dismantle barriers planted into the structure of a society. The relational dimension of peacebuilding is centered on transforming damaged relationships as a result of armed conflict. Intragroup and Intergroup relationships adversely affected during war time are transformed positively through the process of reconciliation to promote compatibility in a society. The personal dimension involves healing at the individual level, which is necessitated by the negative impact of a violent conflict on individuals. The concerned individuals are reconciled, rehabilitated and reintegrated into the society. Therefore, methodological frameworks should be sensitive to socio-cultural and environmental conditions existing in war-torn societies before utilisation. However, Blaney, Klein, and McFate (2010) warned that “in some ways, the over adherence to such approaches is understandable, as donor countries, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) expend great intellectual and real capital developing commendable handbooks, frameworks and other materials for peacebuilding, and are eager to implement these tools in missions. However, the temptation to let the tool drive the mission should be resisted”.

Success and Failure of Peacebuilding Activities: Is it a Methodological Problem?

Peacebuilding and reconstruction programmes have been conducted in Angola, Burundi, Congo Republic, Cyprus, Somalia, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Guinea and Liberia. In Columbia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), Mozambique and in many other countries worldwide. While successes were recorded in some regions, partial successes were recorded in some others and total failure in some countries. This is illustrated in Table 5.

Table 5: Levels of Success and Failure of Peacebuilding Projects

Post-conflict Case	Durch	Stedman	Hampson	Paris	Bertram	Sambanis/ Doyle
Angola	failure	failure	failure	failure		
Bosnia	failure	Partial success		failure		
Cambodia	failure	Partial success	Partial success	Partial success		
Cyprus			failure			
E Slavonia	Partial success					
El Salvador	Success	Success	Success	failure	Success	Success(?)
Guatemala		Success		Partial success		Success
Haiti	Partial success					Success(?)
Lebanon		Success				
Liberia	failure	failure				failure
Mozambique	Success	Success		Success		Success
Nicaragua	Success	Success		Partial success		Success
Namibia	Success	Success	Success	Success	Success	Success
Rwanda	Failure	failure		failure	failure	Success(sic)
Somalia						failure
Sri Lanka		failure				Success
Zimbabwe	Failure					failure

Source: Lund (2003)

The evaluation of the efficacies of peacebuilding programmes is one of the most difficult challenges confronting the exercise. However, determining the opportunity cost of not intervening in war torn countries significantly showed that all peacebuilding programmes actually created positive effects in one way or the other in countries where employed. For instance, the Human Security Brief of 2006 reported that sub-Saharan Africa recorded the greatest decline in armed conflict, thus showing that the continent is no longer the world's most conflict-affected region. This was also corroborated by the report of 2007 Human Security Brief. Both reports concluded that the decline was as a result of the increasing activities of international efforts to end wars and prevent them from restarting, through peacebuilding missions, despite the fact that failure was recorded in some of the peacebuilding projects undertaken. The level of failure recorded in some places may not absolutely be connected with methodological issues, but the circumstances surrounding its operations and the existing complex situations in affected societies. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) captured some of the problems thus:

United States and the United Nations intervened in Somalia, but their effort appeared to lack direction. In Cambodia, the United Nations undertook a multidimensional peace operation—the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia – but the peace it left behind in 1993 was partial at best, suffered a coup in 1997, and now struggles ahead in a renewed coalition government. In El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia) and Mozambique peace is firmer. But even there, the long run prospects of social integration nonetheless remain problematic. In Bosnia, de facto partition still holds sway in most of the country (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000).

The reconstruction efforts of the World Bank (1998) revealed that in most post-conflict countries, government capacity is seriously affected by loss of skills and experience associated with violence and displacement. Government decision making capacity is also confounded by the complexities of post-conflict politics-balancing power blocs, forging alliances, facing the uncertainty of elections, and so forth. In many cases, the post-conflict government is struggling to set up, for the first time, the functions required of a new administration, or even a new state (World Bank, 1998). The major issues that can insightfully be deciphered from the assertions of Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and the report of the World Bank (1998) are internal political dynamics, the complexities of multidimensional peace operations, and the problem of social integration. These problems and others germane to peacebuilding are examined for better understanding in this discourse.

(i) internal political dynamics

The internal political dynamics is influenced by the existing political structure and the degree of political will that the government can demonstrate in a place. The existing political will of a country receding from war is an important parameter for creating the required environment that will encourage the implementation of peacebuilding and reconstruction activities. According to Tschirgi (2004), international peacebuilding, despite its lofty aspirations, is a political undertaking which is ultimately dependent upon the political will and commitment of national governments. Therefore, lack of political will on the part of the government to create the enabling environment for effective peacebuilding operations contributed largely to the defects of the exercise in societies where it failed. In fact, the failure of peacebuilding in Great Lakes region has been attributed, fundamentally, to lack of political will. Political will is a central issue in the determination of the success or failure of a peacebuilding exercise. In Herzegovina and El Salvador, peacebuilding activities were sustained because of the existing political will of the ruling class. The failure of post-conflict peacebuilding strategies in Sierra Leone and Liberia is consequent upon lack of political will to create the required environment in the course of the exercise. The success story of Bosnia, Herzegovina and El Salvador is based on the existence of strong political will, as opined by Filipv (2006). This is very important because it gives focus and sense of direction to efforts in the course of implementing the proposed plan. The organization and administration of the post-conflict peacebuilding process should be anchored on strong political will supported by the leadership structure within a given society.

(ii) The complexities of multidimensional peace operations

The complexities surrounding effective organisation and management of peace operations are the most outstanding challenges of peacebuilding and reconstruction worldwide. Peace operations encompass different activities and tasks that are simultaneously executed in order to achieve peace. These tasks are multidimensional in nature involving rebuilding of economic activities, reconciling individuals and groups, promoting disarmament and re-integration and so on. Therefore, organising and effectively coordinating these tasks pose a serious challenge to achieving set targets. Aliff (2014) asserted that international efforts often lacked the necessary capacity, coordination and flexibility to effectively manage the difficult transition from war to peace. Places like Guatemala, Namibia, and Croatia where peacebuilding operations were orderly coordinated and managed, peace was easily achieved and sustained. Also, Paris (2004) considered the UN peacebuilding operations in Namibia and Croatia to be successful because the operations were conscientiously organised, planned and executed, and thus, builds longer-term sustainable peace and stability; lay foundations for economic recovery and development; build institutions, infrastructures and capacities and overcome legacies and root causes of conflict (Cheng-Hopkins and Gordon, 2014). The capacity to efficiently coordinate and manage peace operations which are multifaceted in nature is a serious issue in peacebuilding efforts.

(iii) Problem of social integration

Conducting peacebuilding is a function of how concerned stakeholders are nested together to fostered orderliness for better organization of tasks for execution. This is an exercise in social engineering which involves bringing people of diverse interests and backgrounds together for proper coordination to pave way for efficient use of scarce resources for optimal result. The peacebuilding efforts in Great Lakes Region had serious complications because of improper integration of the various groups which affected the peacebuilding framework. This framework focused on power sharing and political agreements with rebel groups, while ignoring the fundamental role of local actors, victims of war and civilians such as women groups, youths, religious actors, local non-governmental organizations, and advocacy groups.

Yet, such actors are instrumental in the peacebuilding process (Sikenyi, 2013). The integration of all entities concerned in peacebuilding is a significant factor in the determination of what will happen in the process of implementing the programme in a place.

(iv) The challenge of understanding the root causes of violent conflict

A clear understanding of the factors that drive violent conflict is an important parameter for determining what should be done as solution. In most cases, it is often difficult to come to terms with the real root causes of armed conflicts, even where they are known, how to overcome them constituted a huge problem. This is because in some places, trying to comprehend the issues at stake could lead to the creation of other problems thereby compounding the peacebuilding operations. DFID (2010) reported that when peacebuilding strategies are successfully implemented they tend to ensure the support of inclusive peace processes and agreements; addressing causes and effects of conflict and building mechanisms to resolve conflict peacefully. The most important lessons that can be drawn regarding post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone include the fact that the country was not able to address the causes of the politico-economic based conflict adequately, leading to the failure of the government to guarantee political stability. This development deprived the country of vital economic resources, such as foreign aid and investment, which in turn provoked failure in the recovery of the systems of education and public health (Filirov, 2006). When the drivers of violent conflict are well understood, the problem is half way into resolution. This is essential because it will help to bring the conflict to an end and equally prevent the relapse into another war which is a major factor that often hinder effective peacebuilding programme.

(v) The role of external actors

The role of the external actors is a crucial one in peacebuilding process. The external actors, whether they are international or national organisations contribute greatly in the generation of resources of all kinds for the implementation. Their efforts are sometimes queried because of how they are articulated and conducted, which may have bearing on their organisational mandate that may be different from the priority areas of the peacebuilding project. Thus, instead of implementing the project based on proposed guide, they tend to follow their mandate which may be different from what is required at a particular place and time. According to Schulenburg (2014), “UN peacebuilding missions and international donors provide the bulk of funding and services, which tends to further sideline national authorities. And peacebuilding missions bring the blueprint of a liberal order with them— outlining how to reorganise the state, its institutions, and its economy. This leaves very little room for alternative national choices. This approach provokes resentment. As such, international interventions carry the seeds for their own failures”. Since are different external actors that often participate in peacebuilding projects, it is important that these actors should be properly integrated into the project with their roles clearly defined and their goals incorporated into the main-stream goals to prevent selfish aims which may put the accomplishment of the main goals in jeopardy.

(vi) Problems of resource availability and programme applicability

Peacebuilding is a resource consuming activity. To achieve peace and equally sustain it requires the consumption of both human and material resources. Tschirgi (2004) opined that a strong body of research demonstrates that without timely, sustained and well targeted resources, external support to post-conflict peacebuilding is unlikely to make a significant difference on the ground. Resources should be provided on time, in sufficient quantities and should be judiciously used during peacebuilding. The prudent application of available resources is equally a serious concern in peacebuilding. The dynamic nature of the environment in which the programme will be conducted and the multidimensional character of the tasks to be accomplished, may make the systemic application of resources in relations to proposed methodological guide difficult to implement. Eide, Kaspersen, Kent and Hippel (2005) observed that while there is a tendency to blame the limited success rate of peacebuilding missions on lack of resources, it is equally possible that the main problem is more related to a lack of coherent application of the resources already available. The systematic application of available resources in relations to existing guideline is a serious issue in peacebuilding project. The story of Bosnia and Cambodia would have been more successful if resources provided were sufficient and timely and systematically applied for the projects.

(vii) The idea of liberal peacebuilding

Liberal peacebuilding is a practice that involves the transfer of western style of operations or ways of doing things to other places. This approach of building peace inherently incubates strands of complications which may be inimical to the proposed project, because of variation in existing cultural, socio-economic, political and geographical factors of a place. Thus, what works in a place may not necessarily work elsewhere. The strength and limitations of liberal peacebuilding was well captured by Paris (1997) in this form:

The central tenet of this paradigm (i.e liberal peacebuilding) involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization. This paradigm, however, has not been a particularly effective model for establishing stable peace. Paradoxically, the very process of political and economic liberalization has generated destabilizing side effects in war-shattered states, hindering the consolidation of peace and in some cases even sparking renewed fighting. In Rwanda and Angola, for example, political liberalization contributed to the resurgence of violence; in Bosnia, elections reinforced the separation of the parties rather than facilitating their reconciliation; and in Mozambique, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, the effects of economic liberalization have threatened to reignite conflict (Paris, 1997).

Therefore, the idea of liberal peacebuilding may undermine the way and manner the local actors will support the programme. It was suggested that the liberal internationalist paradigm of peacebuilding has, in various ways, exacerbated social tensions and thus contributed to the continuation or renewal of instability in all but one of these states (Paris, 1997).

Lessons for Nigeria

Nigeria transitioned to democracy in 1999, after three decades of military rule. The return to democracy raised high hopes and muscled up expectations from the people. Contrarily to public expectations, the multiple sources of instability confronting the country, had distorted its potency to deliver the expected dividends to the people. The various geopolitical zones harbour different sources of instability. For instance, there is the issue of resource crisis, kidnapping and militancy in the Niger Delta, and militancy and growing frequency of criminality in the Eastern and Southern parts of the country. Communal violence laced with ethno-religious conflicts as well as the menace of militant herdsmen have continued to manifest adversely in the middle belt region, while ethno-religious conflict, cattle rustling, armed banditry and farmer-herder conflict face the core northern region of the country. However, the emergence of Boko Haram in North-east Nigeria since 2002 has heightened the level of insecurity and instability in the country. Boko Haram insurgency remains the most lethal, destructive and devastating challenge facing Nigeria. Boko Haram has endured as the most serious driver of insecurity after the Nigerian civil war that ended in 1970. The Boko Haram insurgency has claimed over 20,000 lives, destroyed and paralyzed economic activities both in rural and urban areas of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, where their activities are deeply concentrated. Boko Haram went violent in 2009 after the death of its founder Mohammed Yusuf, and with the stepping in of Abubakar Shekau as its leader, the sect employed violence as a means of communication. By 2012, Boko Haram had grown more violently and indiscriminately killings, bombings, abducting, kidnapping people which led to wanton displacement of people and destruction of livelihoods.

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that over 1.5 million people were displaced in 2013. By early 2014, there were an estimated 2.3 million IDPs, making Nigeria the highest in Africa, and the third in the world after Syria and Colombia with 6.5 and 5.7 million respectively. Boko Haram destroyed over 20,000 schools and kidnapped over 3,000 people mostly young girls and women, but the kidnap of 276 school girls at Chibok in April 2014, earned the sect local, regional and international condemnation. The insurgents attacked and destroyed over 150 villages or communities in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) States.

These communities were totally rendered uninhabitable affecting about 15 million people. The Vice President indicated that:

Throughout the region, livelihoods have been disrupted, and homes, public buildings and infrastructure destroyed. In a part of Nigeria where 80% of people rely on agriculture for their livelihoods, much has been lost. People have been forced from their land and livestock has been killed. In many areas, land mines and other remnants of war bring challenges for safe and voluntary return. While Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States bore the brunt of the direct impacts of the conflict, the three neighboring states of Gombe, Taraba and Bauchi have taken in scores of people who have been displaced, taxing their communities, economic resource, social services and infrastructure. Schools have been damaged, health clinic destroyed and many people have been left vulnerable by this crisis (Osinbanjo, 2015).

Therefore, the case at hand critically reflects the fact that the northeast is in dire need of peacebuilding and reconstruction to reactivate the region for meaningful political and socio-economic activities. The ball has been set rolling with the creation of the North East Development Commission (NEDC) to coordinate the peacebuilding project. The awareness has been created, while domestic, regional and international donors including NGOs have shown interest to participate. These include individuals, federal and state governments, African Development Bank, European Union, World Bank, United Nations and other organizations. The peacebuilding strategy developed to guide the project is centred on three core areas which are: peacebuilding, stability and social cohesion, infrastructural and social services and economic recovery. The details of the method are presented in Table 6

Table 6. The peacebuilding strategy for the Northeast

S/No	Peacebuilding Methods	Element		
1	Peacebuilding, Stability and Social Cohesion	(i) Safe and voluntary return and resettlement of displaced persons (ii) Reconciliation, peace building and community cohesion (iii) Governance and citizen engagement (iv) Community security, justice, human rights, mine action and small arms control		
2	Infrastructural and Social Services	(i) Physical Sectors (a) Energy (b) Environment (c) Information and Communication Technology (d) Transport	(ii) Social Sector (a) Education (b) Health and Nutrition (c) Housing (d) Public Buildings (e) Social Protection (f) Water and Sanitation	(iii) Productive Sector (a) Agriculture and Irrigation (b) Private enterprises
3	Economic Recovery	(i) Macroeconomic and fiscal impacts (ii) Finance, trade, and private sector development (iii) Livelihoods (iv) Employment (v) Poverty		

Source: Northeast Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (2015)

The peacebuilding method developed is based on three key areas with some detail elements to be addressed. The infrastructural and social services are further divided into three elements namely: physical sectors, social sectors and productive sectors. The systematic implementation of these elements will bring socioeconomic revival and reconciliation to the northeast. However, it is imperative to learn from the experiences of other societies that have undergone this type of programme for success to be achieved in Nigeria. Therefore, the government should take cognizance of the following issues for successful building of peace in the Northeast.

- (i) The development of appropriate template for synchronizing the various groups that will participate as stakeholders in the programme whether as internal or external donors.

For the success of the peacebuilding project, local, regional or international donors that have shown interest to participate in the programme should be socially nested together for better focus. This is essential in order to foster understanding among the actors, and to make each of them know what is expected of them. This will ensure that what needs to be done is conducted at the right time and as expected. Equally, the fundamental roles of local actors such as village heads, youth groups, community leaders, market women, religious groups, hunters and civilians should be systematically integrated into the programme for efficient coordination. This is important to promote efficient allocation of resources, accountability and orderliness in the course of implementing the project. Thus, social integration of the concerned stakeholders will help to reconcile individual group goals into specific objectives for easy attainment.

- (ii) The problem of effective coordination of the multidimensional tasks of peacebuilding

The peacebuilding method developed as a guide is made up of multidimensional tasks that will be executed at different places, time and in some cases concurrently. How can these tasks be effectively coordinated and implemented to achieve set goals? Where is the observation of flexibility necessary to encourage smooth operations of tasks? The effective coordination of tasks and the determination of where flexibility should be observed are crucial issues that have bearing on the management and execution of the tasks to specifications. These issues define the success story of peacebuilding in Namibia and Croatia. Thus, poor coordination of tasks is one of the challenges confronting most peacebuilding efforts around the world.

- (iii) The selection of the required human resources

Peacebuilding is a specialised field and requires people who are knowledgeable in it to be able to understand what to do and how to do it at any particular time. The point is that qualified people should be recruited for the implementation of tasks because of the complex nature of the programme. Undue sentiments and biases should not be allowed to guide the selection of people for the programme. The success of this programme will depend on the nature and experiences of the human resources that will be used in the implementation stage. If the right set of people are recruited, the best will be achieved when compared with when ethnicity and religion underscore the selection of people for the project.

- (iv) Tackling the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency

In building peace, the drivers of conflict are given priority attention so that they can be tackled to prevent the relapse of the conflict. In fact, the whole essence of peacebuilding is to tackle the root causes of a conflict. To stimulate effective and efficient peacebuilding efforts and to ensure the attainment of set goals, the factors responsible for the emergence of Boko Haram should be addressed in order to prevent its relapse and to pave way for maximum execution of the project.

- (v) The issue of Corruption

Corruption is a major issue that often distorts peacebuilding exercise. Countries where the programme failed, corruption was a leading factor in the process. Corruption promotes misallocation of resources, poor utilisation of allocated resources, misuse of resources and diversion of resources from areas of need to the fulfillment of selfish ends. Corruption should be vigorously fought to a standstill in course of implementing the programme. Nigeria's identity has been smeared because of the existing level of corruption. Organisations such as Transparency International have attested to the fact that corruption is the bane of the development of the country. It is imperative to emphasise that the success of peacebuilding in the Northeast greatly depend on how zero tolerance for corruption can be observed and pursued. At each level of engagement, measures should be put in place to enable those concerned to determine when corruption occurs. This will be a way to prevent a sad end for the project.

- (vi) Provision of material resources

There is no amount of materials that can be enough when executing peacebuilding programme. It should be noted that peacebuilding project is a material resource consuming exercise. Therefore, it will be wrong to conclude that the material resources rolling in even from external donors will be enough for the programme. No amount of material resources will be too much for peacebuilding efforts.

Therefore, more channels should be created for the generation of material resources for the project and efforts should be made to ensure that available material resources are judiciously used to avert misallocation and diversion. This will help to promote effectiveness and efficiency in the use of resources provided for the project.

(vii) Preventing the liberal pattern of peacebuilding

Liberal peacebuilding is considered as the totality of transferring westernized pattern of operations or ways of doing things to a place. Paris (1997) asserted that this paradigm, however, has not been a particularly effective model for establishing stable peace. This is because of the variation in socio-economic, political and geographical factors. What works in a place may not necessarily work elsewhere. It is therefore important to determine the sensitivity of a place before a particular approach can be used. The approach that may work in Borno State may not work in Adamawa State or in Yobe State. Thus, the cultural, socio-economic values and norms of localities should be given priority consideration rather than rejecting them outrightly to impose western norms or adhere to their patterns of operation.

Conclusion

The success of peacebuilding is a function of numerous tasks which are carefully implemented. The perception is that there are more failed than successful peacebuilding projects around the world. However, this does not mean that every other peacebuilding programmes are bound to fail. The complexities surrounding the implementation of peacebuilding projects vary from place to place. For peacebuilding to succeed depends on how it is planned, coordinated and implemented, putting into consideration the peculiar characteristics of a place in terms of culture, values, socio-economic parameters and geographical factors. Therefore, in this study, the historical antecedents of peacebuilding and reconstruction were briefly highlighted as well as the phenomena that underpin their development and expansion. The methods developed to guide peacebuilding projects may not necessarily be a factor for its failure. However, the evolution of peacebuilding methods is significant because it gives focus, direction and understanding to the project and its implementation in a place. Although, the methods vary from place to place resonating the fact that there is no methodological framework applicable to all situation. The variation may depend on the donor organisation or the devastating experience of a country during war time or both. The challenges faced by some countries in the process of implementing peacebuilding programme were examined to account for the reasons why some projects failed. These discourses were insightfully illustrated to create a clearer of what transpires around the world concerning the peacebuilding efforts, and how lessons that can be drawn from them can be used as guide for building peace in the Northeast in Nigeria. Boko Haram decimated the Northeast, killing thousands of people, totally destroying both public and private facilities leaving the region desolate. The level of havoc perpetrated by Boko Haram in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States necessitated the need for peacebuilding and reconstruction in the region. The approach set out as methodological guide for the implementation of the project was examined, in addition to the various problems that may inhibit the smooth operations of the method for successful building of peace in the region.

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